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Abstract 
 
In the frame of the Stairway to Excellence project, complex country analysis was performed for the EU MS that joined the 
EU since 2004, with the objective to assess and corroborate all the qualitative and quantitative data in drawing 
national/regional FP7 participation patterns, understand the push–pull factors for FP7/H2020 participation and the factors 
affecting the capacity to absorb cohesion policy funds. This report articulates analysis on selected aspects and country-
tailored policy suggestions aiming to tackle the weaknesses identified in the analysis. 
 
The report complements the complex qualitative/ quantitative analysis performed by the IPTS/KfG/S2E team. In order to 
avoid duplication and cover all the elements required for a sound analysis, the report builds on analytical framework 
developed by IPTS. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The report offers a comprehensive overview of factors and mechanisms, which contribute to the national 
participation patterns in Framework Programme 7 (FP7), absorption of EU Structural Funds (SF) and the 
synergies between these two funding streams in Poland. Its findings are based on field studies (24 interviews 
with Research & Innovation – R&I – performers, government organisations and funding agencies) as well as 
desk research. 
Chapter 1 includes introductory remarks, outlining the background of the “Stairway to Excellence” project. 
Chapter 2 discusses the governance of the R&I system, presenting institutions involved in design and 
implementation of SF in 2007-2013 and European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) for the 2014-
2020 perspective. Based on interviews, specific challenges were identified, related to: co-ordination in the R&I 
system (including co-ordination between central government institutions and regional agencies), availability 
of policy instruments (with focus on competitively distributed, short-term grants, lack of R&D tax incentives, 
and shortcomings in the design of support measures available in 2007-2013, which were rectified in the new 
financial perspective) as well as complicated administrative procedures. It offers an analysis of Poland’s 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, focused on the institutional governance of ESIF. 
Chapter 3 further explores factors that support or limit national participation in R&I calls funded by ESIF, 
pointing to shortcomings such as: imperfect design of some support measures, ambiguity surrounding co-
funding requirements for certain projects and cost eligibility, as well as managerial capacities of applicant 
organisations, including specific cases of public universities and public research institutes. It also discusses 
the capacities of funding agencies and steps taken to reduce administrative burdens at the ESIF application 
and implementation stages in 2014-2020. 
Chapter 4 outlines reasons for limited participation of Polish organisations in FP7 and Horizon 2020 (H2020 
actions), referring to: competition with other, nationally available funding opportunities, personnel lack certain 
skills (including limited command of English and limited international contacts), only marginal involvement in 
H2020 programming and lack of adequate representation of Polish interests in Brussels, demotivating salary 
and intellectual property rights (IPR) regulations in H2020, and insufficient academic recognition of 
researchers managing externally funded R&I projects. 
Chapter 5 presents policy instruments, which facilitate the participation in ESIF and FP7/H2020, outlining 
support for applicants, activities of the National Contact Point, financial support for FP7/H2020 project 
proponents, governmental plans to establish a dedicated contact point and funding for H2020 application 
drafting by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the “Pact for Horizon 2020”, signed by the 
Ministry of Science and Education with universities and research institutes, including reciprocal commitments 
intended to increase the Polish participation in H2020. 
In chapter 6, experiences with evaluation and monitoring of ESIF are described, demonstrating the limited 
role of international evaluators and shortcomings in evaluation criteria used for some support measures. It 
also discusses the policy learning based on ESIF monitoring mechanisms and positive changes in the wake of 
the 2014-2020 ESIF perspective. 
Chapter 7 lists factors, which limit the synergies between ESIF and H2020, including: differences in legal 
frameworks, H2020 salary regulations demotivating researchers from Polish public universities and research 
institutes, and H2020 IPR regulations considered as problematic by some innovative SMEs, challenges in 
using research infrastructures established with ESIF funding, organisational barriers including accounting and 
auditing practices discouraging high-risk innovative projects, as well as the evolving design of Poland's ESIF 
support measures, as a dedicated measure intended to increase the H2020 readiness of SMEs was 
eliminated from Poland's operational programme. The subsequent discussion of factors supporting the 
synergies points to multiple support measures, directly complementing the funding available from 
FP7/H2020, including examples of parallel funding ( “TEAM”, local support for KIC co-location centres), 
simultaneous/cumulative funding ( “IDEAS FOR POLAND”, and two dedicated measures included in 2014-
2020 ESIF: “International Research Agendas”, complementing H2020 Teaming, and “Virtual Research 
Institutes”, adding value to H2020 Twinning), alternative funding ( “Ideas Plus”), as well as the ease of 
securing sequential funding to combine multiple funding sources and ensure continuity of research efforts. 
Importantly, synergies are not only found between FP7/H2020 and SF/ESIF, but also involve multiple support 
measures funded from the Polish state budget. 
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Chapter 8 offers insights into the take-up of public sector research results, discussing available support 
measures and providing examples of successful commercialisation of research results. 
Chapter 9 includes a detailed list of policy suggestions, concerning: (a) strengthening of ESIF-H2020 
synergies, (b) improvement of R&I support in Poland, and (c) actions to be taken by the European Commission 
to better serve the EU member states and contribute to their innovative development. 
Chapter 10 summarizes the factors behind different regional levels of participation in FP7 and SF, 
presenting divergences in R&I performance, which influence the levels of R&D investment and applications 
for external funding. 
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1 INTRODUCTION1 
 
Background of the “Stairway to Excellence” project  
The European Commission Framework Programme (FP) for research and technology development has been 
vital in the development of European knowledge generation. However, there is considerable disparity across 
EU countries and regions in terms of FP participation and innovation performance. 
Horizon 2020 will continue to provide funding on the basis of excellence, regardless of geographical location. 
However, it will also introduce novel measures for “spreading excellence and widening participation” by 
targeting low Research & Innovation (R&I) performing countries - most of whom are eligible for innovation 
funding under Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020. 
In addition, the new regulations for ESIF aim to use funds more effectively to build regional/national 
excellence and capacities. By doing so, the key funding sources (ESIF and Horizon 2020) can complement one 
another along the entire innovation process. 
 
Objective of S2E 
The Stairway to Excellence (S2E) project is centred on the provision of support to enhance the value of the 
key European Union (EU) funding sources for research, development and innovation: European Structural and 
Investment Funds and Horizon 2020 but also the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (COSME), Erasmus+, Creative Europe, European Union Programme for Employment and 
Social Innovation ("EaSI") and the digital services part of the Connecting Europe Facility by actively promoting 
their combination. The S2E project is funded by the European Parliament and entrusted by DG-REGIO to JRC- 
IPTS. The project has two main objectives, namely: 
• Providing of assistance to regions and countries that joined the EU since 2004 in closing the innovation 
gap, in order to promote excellence in all regions and EU countries; 
• Stimulating the early and effective implementation of national and regional Smart Specialisation 
Strategies. 
 
Main purpose of the document 
In the frame of the project, complex country analysis is performed for all 13 EU MS with the objective to 
assess and corroborate all the qualitative and quantitative data in drawing national/regional FP7 participation 
patterns, understand the push–pull factors for FP7 participation and the factors affecting the capacity to 
absorb cohesion policy funds. This report articulates analysis on selected aspects and country-tailored policy 
suggestions aiming to tackle the weaknesses identified in the analysis. 
The report complements the complex qualitative/ quantitative analysis performed the IPTS/KfG/S2E team. In 
order to avoid duplication and cover all the elements required for a sound analysis, the report builds on 
analytical framework developed by IPTS. 
                                                        
1
 Contents of the introductory chapter were provided by JRC-IPTS and incorporated in all national S2E reports. 
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2 QUALITY OF THE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1. Overview. Polish public administration is often regarded as overly bureaucratic and not sufficiently 
reactive, but even the interviewed critics highlighted positive changes in recent years, concerning the 
governance of the R&I system. These changes included the establishment of new agencies, reassignment of 
ESIF-related tasks and shortening administrative procedures. The government and funding agencies drew 
important lessons from the 2007-2013 financial perspective and prepared the new ESIF-related programmes 
and procedures taking into account good practices and comments of beneficiaries. It should also be noted 
that in the World Bank’s ranking “Doing Business 2015”, Poland was ranked the 32nd in the world, and the 
14th in the European Union, with only Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ranking higher among the new EU 
member states (World Bank, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1. Organogram – governance of R&I funds (including structural funds for R&I). 
 
2.2. Governance of the R&I system. Figure 1 offers an overview of institutions in the Polish R&I system, 
with particular focus on the design and implementation of relevant SF/ESIF instruments. It uses different 
background and border patterns to indicate institutions active in the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 
perspectives. 
In 2007-2013, a multiplicity of intermediaries was distributing ESIF funds through various, sometimes 
overlapping support measures. This eclectic landscape resulted from governance changes resulting from the 
2010-2011 reform of the science and higher education sector, which established or empowered dedicated 
agencies (Klincewicz, 2014). The main co-ordinating role for SF/ESIF was played by the managing authority, 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MIR, Ministerstwo Infrastruktury i Rozwoju, www.mir.gov.pl), 
previously named “Ministry of Regional Development”. Poland had 6 centrally implemented operational 
programmes (including one dedicated to the development of regions of the Eastern Poland), supplemented by 
16 regional programmes (MIR, 2015a). R&I-related support measures were included in several centrally 
managed programmes and in all regional programmes, covering R&D, support for innovations in business 
sector, establishment of research infrastructures, training and innovative doctoral studies. Regional 
programmes were designed by individual regions with substantial diversity of support measures, evaluation 
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criteria, eligible costs and modalities. On the central level, R&D-related measures were initially offered by the 
Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP, Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, 
www.parp.gov.pl), focused on business enterprises, and by the Information Processing Centre (OPI, Ośrodek 
Przetwarzania Informacji, www.opi.org.pl), working with scientific organisations. In 2010, the National Centre 
for Research and Development (NCBiR, Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, www.ncbir.pl) expanded its 
operations and took over the most important, SF-based R&D support measures (Klincewicz, 2014: 12-14). 
The change was welcomed by many beneficiaries, and interviews revealed substantial improvements in 
streamlining procedures and pursuing more open attitudes towards applicants and beneficiaries by NCBiR. 
This change needs to be taken into account when interpreting the results of interviews: general comments, 
concerning the governance of SF in 2007-2013, might consider either the pre-2011 period (with relevant 
measures implemented by PARP, OPI) or the post-2011 period (with the new role of NCBiR). Some measures 
were directly offered by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MNiSW, Ministerstwo Nauki i 
Szkolnictwa Wyższego, www.nauka.gov.pl) and the Ministry of Economy (MG, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 
www.mg.gov.pl), while financial instruments were distributed by the state-owned bank BGK (Bank 
Gospodarstwa Krajowego, www.bgk.pl). More narrow, well-targeted measures intended to strengthen the 
research excellence in the science sector were distributed by the non-public Foundation for Polish Science 
(FNP, Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej, www.fnp.org.pl), and while the overall SF budget distributed through 
FNP was comparatively small, these measures offered important synergies with FP7 funding and will further 
be discussed in the present report. The 2007-2013 SF governance structures suffered from imperfect co-
ordination, overlaps of support measures and competitive struggles between agencies and ministries, trying 
to demonstrate their usefulness in the future R&I framework. Importantly, Poland also had a substantial 
number of relevant R&I support measures funded from the state budget, and distributed by NCBiR and PARP, 
alongside with additional programmes managed by FNP and funded from the Foundation’s own sources. 
The design of new ESIF operational programmes and support measures coincided with a wide-ranging 
institutional reform of the R&I system, resulting from the adoption of high-level strategic documents 
“Strategy for the Innovation and Efficiency of the Economy” (SIEG, “Strategia Innowacyjności i Efektywności 
Gospodarki”) (RM, 2013) and “Enterprise Development Programme” (PRP, “Program Rozwoju Przedsiębiorstw”) 
(RM, 2014), which defined policy objectives and assigned responsibilities to specific public bodies. With SIEG 
and PRP in place, the design of ESIF operational programmes was relatively easier, as key R&I support 
directions had been extensively consulted with stakeholders and discussed within the government before 
designing the individual support measures. In 2014-2020, R&I funding will be focused on specific thematic 
areas of KIS (National Smart Specialisations, “Krajowe Inteligentne Specjalizacje”) (MG, 2015) or regional 
specialisations, and large research infrastructure investments will be linked to the contents of PMDIB (Polish 
Roadmap for Research Infrastructure, “Polska Mapa Drogowa Infrastruktury Badawczej”) (MNiSW, 2014b). 
These planning documents were defined through bottom-up processes, with large-scale foresight projects, 
calls for submission and consultations with stakeholders. This presents a substantial improvement compared 
with the previous financial perspective. 
The main R&I funding programme in the 2014-2020 perspective, the Operational Programme Smart Growth 
(POIR, “Program Operacyjny Inteligentny Rozwój”) (MIR, 2015b) was designed by MIR, MNiSW, MG, NCBiR and 
PARP, with extensive involvement of stakeholders representing R&I performers, financial institutions as well 
as other public and regional bodies. POIR clearly defines the intervention priorities as: R&D funding (co-
ordinated by NCBiR), support for innovations in private sector and enabling environments for innovations (co-
ordinated by MG and PARP, with specific instruments also expected to be offered by BGK and ARP - Industrial 
Development Agency, Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu, www.arp.pl), and support for the science sector (with 
measures offered by NCBiR, OPI and FNP). POIR funding is distributed based on 19 national smart 
specialisations (KIS, “Krajowe Inteligentne Specjalizacje”), and KIS development and updates are co-ordinated 
by the Ministry of Economy (MG, 2015). All 16 regional operational programmes include complementary 
support measures, focused on establishing research infrastructures consistent with the regional smart 
specialisations (identified locally in each region), and supporting smaller R&I projects. While preserving 
regional variations, these measures followed standardized templates to ensure comparable forms of support 
in various regions, and agencies from several regions signed co-operative agreements with NCBiR to benefit 
from the Centre’s experiences in application evaluation and its extensive pool of evaluators. 
Additional, important roles are played by: the National Service Network (KSU, Krajowy System Usług, 
www.ksu.parp.gov.pl), which includes private-sector training and consulting companies, commissioned to 
support SMEs in matters including R&I and the Polish Patent Office (UPRP, Urząd Patentowy Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, www.uprp.pl), managing SF/ESIF-based systemic projects to support research performers and 
promote IPR protection. National governance of FP7/H2020 participation is based on the National Contact 
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Point (KPK, Krajowy Punkt Kontaktowy Programów Badawczych Unii Europejskiej, www.kpk.gov.pl) in Warsaw, 
with a network of small, regional contact points (RPK, Regionalne Punkty Kontaktowe). The NCP with its 
regional network reports to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. 
The following sections of the chapter will present selected features of the R&I governance system, which 
were identified as important by interviewees2 as they impact the national participation in FP7/H2020 and the 
absorption of SF/ESIF. The contents of this chapter are further expanded in chapter 3, which offers more 
detailed discussions of factors related to the SF funding. 
2.3. Co-ordination in the R&I system. The number of institutions involved in SF/ESIF distribution is large, 
and results from the size of the country and substantial ESIF allocations. In the years of 2007-2013, there 
were some functional overlaps between SF implementing agencies, which led to competitive, inter-
governmental dynamics. The institutional framework for 2014-2020 was established after an internal 
reshuffle within the public administration (Klincewicz, 2014: 14), informed by opinions of stakeholders and 
results of a comprehensive evaluation of the Poland's innovation system, carried out by the World Bank 
(Kapil et al., 2012). The current division of responsibilities on the national level matches institutional 
competencies and ensures good co-ordination. In particular, specific organisational problems identified in the 
2007-2013 perspective had been addressed, and the adequacies of these solutions were verified in the 
course of ex ante evaluations of the new operational programmes. 
However, more challenging will be the co-ordination between the national and regional levels. In 2007-2013, 
part of SF R&I funding was distributed by regional agencies, without clearly distinguished support measures. 
In 2014-2020, regions assume even more responsibility for R&I funding, but their support measures were 
included in the nation-wide planning process, and are expected to complement not substitute the centrally 
available funding. As revealed in interviews with R&I performers conducted for this project, experiences of 
beneficiaries with regional agencies tended to be worse than with the centrally distributed funds. According 
to representatives of regional funding agencies, regions had limited contacts with central ministries, and 
imperfect access to information, which resulted in different interpretations of the same regulations by 
different agencies. Since 2013, regional agencies and central ministries meet on a regular basis in the 
framework of the Regional Forum for Smart Specializations (Regionalne Forum Inteligentnych Specjalizacji), 
which was instrumental in sharing knowledge about design of R&I-related support measures and exchanging 
experiences. 
Interviews with representatives of governmental institutions offered other examples of co-ordination 
problems in the 2007-2013 perspective. Formal acceptances of support measures and funding modalities 
proved to be very time consuming, with delays caused both by the Polish side and the European Commission. 
There might have been cases when some funding agencies had to announce calls for proposals before all the 
formalities were finalized (in order to fill the substantial funding gap at the beginning of the financial 
perspective), accepting the risk of contributing government funding to finance successful project proposals if 
further procedural delays occur. In early 2015, interviewees representing R&I funding agencies, reliant on 
ESIF, feared that similar problems might arise in the present ESIF perspective, and their apprehensions could 
                                                        
2 Note on research methodology. The field research, described in this report, involved structured interviews with 
relevant stakeholders, based on a list of questions prepared by IPTS-JRC and common for all countries participating in the 
S3E project. 24 interviews were carried out in February and March 2015, and each interview involved 1-3 interviewees. 
The sampling was purposing, intended to increase the variance in experiences and opinions, taking into account different 
institutional settings, research fields, regions and organisational positions. The research sample included: 
 3 central government ministries (Ministry of Infrastructure and Development, Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education, Ministry of Economy), 
 4 funding agencies (National Centre for Research and Development, Foundation for Polish Science and regional 
funding agencies from two regions, distributing SF/ESIF funding for R&I), 
 National Contact Point for Research Programmes of the European Union in Warsaw and one of Regional Contact 
Points, 
 5 business enterprises, including 4 R&I performers, who benefited from SF or FP7, and 1 consulting company, 
experienced in supporting R&I projects, 
 7 representatives of 3 public universities representing different regions of Poland and different disciplines 
(chemistry, computer sciences, energy, humanities, physics, telecommunications), including 2 persons in managerial 
positions, in charge of EC funding and project management, one of them managing a Polish co-location centre of 
Knowledge and Innovation Community, 
 4 representatives of public research institutes, including 2 researchers and 2 project directors. 
The anonymity of individual interviewees is ensured based on their requests preceding the interviews, and the report only 
contains excerpts and summaries of their opinions, not attributable to individual speakers. 
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partly be attributed to the long-lasting strategic dialogue between the European Commission and the Polish 
authorities, concerning the ESIF design. Nevertheless, Poland managed to conclude the dialogue soon after 
the interviews and first ESIF-based calls were launched in the first half of 2015. Representatives of 
ministries and funding agencies expressed some critical comments concerning the dynamics of the strategic 
dialogue and limited flexibility of the EC with regards to ESIF 2014-2020. DG REGIO explained that the 
dialogue’ had to be based on the provisions of the Partnership Agreement signed by the EC with Poland, 
which outline the initial scope of the intended ESIF support measures and defined the legitimate mandate for 
the dialogue.  
According to the interviews, some support measures, which were initially included in the draft operational 
programme (POIR) based on extensive public-private consultation processes, conducted in a mode resembling 
the proposed entrepreneurial discovery process and focused on raising private expenditures on R&D, were 
eliminated or thoroughly modified in the course of the strategic dialogue. When commenting on the interview 
results, DG REGIO explained that operational programmes and support measures were assessed taking into 
consideration the specificity of the funding source, aimed at stimulating innovation, technological 
development and applied R&D related to business needs and capabilities. One of the measures, eliminated 
from the POIR in the course of the strategic dialogue, was supposed to address the core theme of the 
present report: strengthening synergies between ESIF and H2020 (see detailed discussion in section 7.7. of 
this report). 
Another shortcoming in the 2007-2013 perspective was the lack of consistency between several operational 
programmes, resulting from isolated SF programming efforts in 2006-2007. The main funding source for 
R&I was POIG (Operational Programme Innovative Economy), but relevant measures were also included in 
POKL (Operational Programme Human Capital) and POIŚ (Operational Programme Infrastructure and 
Environment), albeit with sub-optimal funding modalities, e.g. training of researchers or doctoral studies 
could not be combined with R&D components, or scientific infrastructure could be used only for teaching not 
research. These shortcomings were eliminated when programming the current ESIF perspective. 
The governance of ESIF in 2014-2020 has been decided, but more problematic is the broader co-ordination 
of R&I policies. Several ministries and agencies are involved, but not a single governmental institution 
assumes the overall responsibility. Top-level policy documents SIEG and PRP define targets and 
implementation plans in R&I area, but the actual co-ordination between various ministries remains 
challenging. As one of interviewees mentioned, nobody knows who should actually assure the co-ordination. 
This clarity is only available for ESIF-based R&I efforts. However, as some interviewees suggested, the 
challenge is typical for other institutional settings as well, concerning e.g. co-ordination of R&I-related 
initiatives within the EC. In a similar manner, applicants and beneficiaries complained about the lack of a 
“one-stop shop” approach to R&I funding: no central contact points or government-maintained websites exist, 
listing all available support measures and funding opportunities. Poland offers a multiplicity of relevant 
instruments, extending beyond SF/ESIF, and new applicants might be intimidated by this variety. 
2.4. Availability of policy instruments. Many of the interviewed R&I actors complained about the lack of 
R&D tax incentives. Two types of relevant, functionally restricted tax credits exist, but these measures are 
available only to a small group of organisations and do not adequately incentivize research efforts. Public co-
funding for R&I in Poland is based on competitively distributed grants, and this approach has certain inherent 
limitations. Not every organisation can benefit from grants, and individual access to funding for R&D can 
never be stable or planned in a long-term. Organisations are forced to operate “from one grant to another”, 
and the continuity of funding for subsequent stages of research and technology development is uncertain. 
R&D tax exemptions could facilitate the planning of technology development by business enterprises. When 
commenting on the grant-based system, one interviewee stated that “one carries out projects that fall into 
the category of things that could be [co-]funded. We would not run around for 10 years, looking for project 
funding, when we see that nobody is interested in financing the project, because it would be a waste of our 
resources. Some ideas are too innovative, too future-oriented”. Universities and public research organisations 
are in turn dependent on a mixture of project and institutional funding, distributed based on past 
performance and research excellence, so ambitious R&D initiatives could not be pursued without relevant 
grants. 
Interviewees representing various R&I performing sectors interpreted government actions as focused on 
dividing funds and controlling their use, while the R&I performers would rather expect “partnerships” and joint 
definition of long-term plans for funding specific research initiatives. At the same time, this approach is 
changing with the launch of new support measures in POIR, in particular: sectoral programmes, in which 
research agendas emerge from extensive data analysis in feasibility studies and dialogues between industry 
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sector representation and NCBiR, and expected deliverables, milestones and allocations are defined jointly in 
a public-private partnership. 
Most interviewees were satisfied with the portfolio of support measures. In the 2007-2013 perspective, there 
were funding gaps in the innovation cycle, related to low allocation levels for certain support measures, with 
all available funding for certain purposes used up early during the financial perspective. These funding gaps 
seem to be addressed in 2014-2020, with budgets allocated for specific support measures adjusted to 
match the market needs. 
In some cases, interviewees representing R&I performers from various sectors (higher education, research 
institutes, business enterprises) pointed to problems with specific criteria, used to define the scope of calls 
for proposals, eligibility and evaluation. In particular, some of regionally available support measures might 
have been defined without appropriate technical or legal knowledge, resulting in multiple impracticalities. 
Some calls accepted only projects with relatively high budgets (i.e. bottom line set for minimum eligible value 
of project budget), and applicants meeting all other criteria but proposing a project with more modest 
financial requirements were not able to apply. This approach might have promoted funding inefficiencies, 
with some applicants incorporating unnecessary expenditures into their projects merely to meet the 
budgetary restrictions of a call. 
There was an impression shared by some interviewees, that R&I support measures in 2007-2013 did not pay 
adequate attention to the sustainability of project results. The examples concerned large infrastructure 
investments in peripheral academic centres, and overall focus on infrastructure and research rather than on 
the commercialisation of research results. POIR in 2014-2020 emphasises the importance of practically 
oriented R&D, innovations and implementation, focusing on business enterprises, and this approach resulted 
from the EC’s and government's concerns about project sustainability as well as extensive consultations with 
stakeholders. 
Poland's policy learning in SF/ESIF was based on a trial-and-error process, with continuous improvements of 
support measures and funding modalities in 2007-2013, and an overall redesign of the policy framework in 
the wake of the 2014-2020 period. NCBiR launched multiple small-scale pilots of R&I support measures, 
funded from the state budget, to test their suitability, identify challenges at application evaluation and 
project implementation stages and gather the feedback from stakeholders. Some of the successful measures 
were incorporated into POIR, others are expanded with national funding, and yet another set of instruments 
was discarded after the pilot stage. 
The improvements incorporated in the POIR’s design include: 
 launch of sectoral programs to stimulate the entrepreneurial discovery processes with 
representative stakeholders from selected industrial sectors, 
 availability of instruments covering the entire innovation cycle, including support for developing 
technological prototypes based on R&D results, 
 streamlining application evaluation processes and internal procedures at funding agencies to offer 
fast-track funding instruments, i.e. radically shorten the time between application and award of a 
grant, 
 elaboration of criteria for evaluation of applications and lists of eligible costs. 
 
Some interviewees expressed concerns that their specific proposals were not incorporated in the new 
operational programmes - but as one of government representatives explained, at the stage of ESIF design, 
some stakeholders were expecting “the largest possible sums of money distributed with the easiest possible 
conditions, preferably without any accountability”. The co-operation between policy makers and private sector 
might still be perceived as unsatisfactory, as the business community does not have adequate 
representation, capable of entertaining a policy-focused dialogue with the government or the European 
Commission. The public efforts centred around the design of Poland's smart specialisations and sectoral R&D 
programmes, as well as a nation-wide identification of key innovation clusters, are expected to strengthen 
this representativeness and internal co-ordination within the enterprise sector. 
Poland's R&I policy was planned with the time horizon until 2020, and there seems to be no permanent 
feedback/policy learning mechanism embedded. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the positive, evidence-
based approach characteristic for the 2014-2020 ESIF perspective, with bottom-up planning and broad 
stakeholder consultations, would be replicated in the future. 
2.5. Complicated administrative procedures. SF application and implementation processes in 2007-
2013 involved high degrees of formalization. Some beneficiaries complained that funding agencies tend to 
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implicitly assume a bad will and possible wrongdoings of applicants, and thus established invasive control 
mechanisms, or carried out project audits with the preconceived intention to identify irregularities. This 
relatively low level of trust results in excessive caution of beneficiaries and high transaction costs. At the 
same time, Poland enjoys high SF absorption rates with only a very small number of problematic projects. 
When asked about problems with potential corruption or discretional decision making in R&I funding, all 24 
interviewees categorically stated that they could not imagine such scenarios, in particular with reference to 
R&I funding based on SF in Poland. These irregularities would be impossible due to the stringency of 
procedures, the national implementation of anti-corruption measures, and the oversight of funding 
instruments by dedicated programme committees, involving stakeholder representation who regularly 
analyse the results of programme evaluations, carried out by independent third-parties. Interestingly, some 
informants highlighted the contrast between the consistency and transparency of SF in Poland and the more 
ambiguous approach visible in EC's framework programmes, where work programmes and calls for proposals 
might have been influenced by powerful lobbying organisations, and the ambiguity of some documents and 
evaluation criteria that diverge from standards to which Polish applicants are accustomed thanks to SF. 
Dissatisfaction with the administrative burdens, related to SF funding, was common among interviewees. 
Many of requirements, which were perceived as inefficient, result from legal and procedural requirements of 
the EC. Interestingly, some interviewees noticed that the same funding agencies, which were involved in SF 
implementation, were able to act more efficiently when distributing state-based funding for R&I. This 
confirms that the perceived relative inefficiency is linked to specific SF regulations rather than being a 
general feature of the Polish public administration. Interviewees identified significant differences in attitudes 
and modes of work of funding agencies, with the measures available from FNP and NCBiR considered the 
most “applicant-friendly”, requiring relatively simple application contents and clearly linked to the evaluation 
criteria. 
Additionally, some organizations, which actively benefit from SF, including public universities, adopt internal 
regulations based on the most stringent ESIF-related requirements in order to avoid potential problems with 
project implementation. This behaviour unnecessarily complicates the work of researchers, and is not a 
feature of Polish public administration, but rather results from a risk-averse approach of organizational 
management. When discussing the inefficient procedures, representatives of ministries and funding agencies 
also provided examples of interactions with the European Commission, which resulted in substantial delays in 
accepting Polish proposals for improvements of certain support measures in the 2007-2013 perspective (e.g. 
a delay of 2 years in responding to Poland’s proposal of adjustments to cost calculation methodology, as 
stated by an interviewed government representative), and some of the interviewees expressed dissatisfaction 
with the design of certain ESIF support measures adopted for 2014-2020. 
When discussing the complexity of application procedures, representatives of government and funding 
agencies turned out to be more critical than the funding beneficiaries. As one public-sector representative 
explained, there is a constant struggle with “the hydra-headed bureaucracy” within the domestic public 
administration, attempts to simplify matters and reduce administrative burdens. Some requirements could 
not be eliminated due to legal requirements, particularly with reference to ESIF. At the same time, Poland 
managed to modify its legal framework in ways supporting faster absorption of funds, e.g. in 2014, the Acts 
on Public Procurement and on Higher Education were amended, facilitating the use of public procurement in 
scientific R&D projects and improving organisational IPR management practices. 
In the first years of Poland's EU membership, some SF application criteria were considered unjustified. 
Widely-cited examples referred to included: applicants being required to fill in their applications using blue 
ballpoint pens, with other colours disqualifying the documents, or the need to sign and stamp every single 
page of application and annexes. Applications included extensive narratives concerning e.g. consistency 
between the proposed project and regional development strategies, which could be copied across various 
applications and were most likely not really evaluated. A representative of a public university pointed to 
another example of problematic requirements: the need to formally prove that a university with several 
hundred years of tradition will continue its operations after the project completion. For some types of 
applications, complex feasibility studies or business plans were require, and were costly and time-consuming 
to produce, even though not really used at proposal evaluation and project implementation stages, as actual 
business planning processes differed from the required templates. Interestingly, beneficiaries were less 
critical of the administrative burdens than the government representatives. As one company representative 
explained, “in the end, we are applying for large sums of money and these people also need to verify us”. An 
interviewed representative of a large consulting firm, specializing among others in SF/FP application 
development, suggested that Polish companies can cope with the application procedures, and only about 10-
20% of applications are prepared in co-operation with consultants, while SMEs usually resort to the help of 
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consulting firms for their first application, afterwards continuing without external help. An interviewee 
representing management of a large public university maintained that while applications procedures might 
be complicated, applicants know certain typical requirements and have mastered addressing them. As many 
respondents confirmed, the use of appropriate “policy language” and the inclusion of certain keywords greatly 
enhances the funding probability. 
The government learned a lesson from these initial shortcomings, and this is visible in procedures, prepared 
for the 2014-2020 perspective, with streamlined application contents, easy to understand evaluation criteria, 
reduced number of necessary documents and reliance on electronically submitted applications, linked to an 
external workflow system of the funding agency. Many of these positive changes resulted from the 
continuous interactions between the European Commission (DG REGIO) and the Polish authorities. For the 
most popular R&D support measure, co-funding research projects of SMEs, NCBiR committed to complete the 
evaluations and communicate the funding decisions within 60 days from the application submission. 
2.6. SWOT analysis. An analysis of the Polish R&I system’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats will be presented, taking into account the narrative presented above, as well as further insights from 
interview and desk research, which are outlined in chapter 3 of the report. The SWOT analysis is focused on 
the governance of the SF/ESIF, representing changes between the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 perspectives. 
 
Positive factors Negative factors 
Strengths Weaknesses 
1) high absorption rates of SF in 2007-2013 
2) high ESIF allocations for R&I in the 2014-2020 
perspective 
3) ethical and transparent application evaluation 
procedures 
4) policy learning, taking into account lessons learned, 
results of evaluations and stakeholder consultations 
5) reactiveness of funding agencies and government 
institutions, including modifications of support 
measures during the 2007-2013 cycle 
6) ESIF modalities for 2014-2020 improved based on 
2007-2013 experiences 
7) strong orientation towards the commercialisation of 
R&D results 
8) R&I support measures covering the entire innovation 
cycle 
9) fast-track funding decisions in R&I support measures, 
2014-2020 
10) good research infrastructures, established in the 
2007-2013 perspective 
 
1) lack of stable R&I funding through tax exemptions 
forcing companies to rely on grants 
2) isolated SF programming efforts for different 
operational programmes in the 2007-2013 
perspective 
3) imbalance between ministries and funding agencies 
with imperfect co-ordination 
4) limited co-ordination between central and regional 
funding agencies – and regional preferences to 
independently shape own R&I policies 
5) lack of a “one-stop shop” approach to applicants and 
beneficiaries 
6) high administrative burdens in SF projects 
7) lack of trust, with excessive controls of beneficiaries 
and distance maintained between public 
administration and private companies 
8) risk aversion of funding agencies, resulting from 
inability to cover ineligible costs from own sources 
9) long delays accepting amendments to plans of SF-
funded projects by agencies 
10) complicated rules for using research infrastructures 
funded by SF in the 2007-2013 perspective 
11) low salaries in the public science sector 
12) low remuneration of application evaluators 
 
Opportunities 
Threats 
1) customer-oriented attitudes of funding agencies 
NCBiR and FNP 
2) streamlining application and evaluation processes in 
the 2014-2020 perspective 
3) planned use of expert panels to strengthen evaluation 
of innovativeness and commercial potential of 
projects 
4) NCBiR's sectoral programmes capturing the essence 
of entrepreneurial discovery process 
5) policy focus on stimulating science-industry 
collaboration 
6) stronger role of regions in distributing ESIF funding 
for R&I in 2014-2020 
1) excessive focus on technology development by 
business enterprises in ESIF, with less support for 
scientific research 
2) limited interests of business enterprises in R&I efforts 
3) NCBiR's work overload in the 2014-2020 perspective 
4) substantial R&I funding distributed in the 2014-2020 
perspective through regional agencies, with limited 
relevant regional experiences, as R&D support was 
centrally co-ordinated in 2007-2013 
5) risk of evaluating the ESIF applications without 
sufficient involvement of business experts if numbers 
of applications are very high 
6) ESIF applicants mastering “the art of writing 
13 
 
7) direct complementarities between ESIF and H2020 
support measures 
applications” rather than carrying out good projects 
7) funding agencies focusing on meeting quantitative 
targets for ESIF with less interest in research 
excellence and innovativeness 
8) public universities and research institutes adopting 
conservative interpretations of legal regulations and 
thus complicating project implementation 
9) limited command of English among business 
enterprises, restricting their involvement in 
international programmes 
Table 1. SWOT analysis of the governance of R&I system, focused on the governance of SF/ESIF. 
Source: own elaboration. 
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3 FACTORS THAT SUPPORT OR LIMIT THE NATIONAL PARTICIPATION 
IN R&I CALLS FUNDED BY SF/ESIF 
 
3.1. Design of ESIF support measures. In the 2007-2013 period, SF funding instruments for R&I included 
a wide selection of measures, matching requirements of various applicant groups. As the interviewed 
government representatives suggested, certain support measures were premature (e.g. support for innovation 
clusters, as such clusters did hardly exist in 2007), certain levels of allocations proved insufficient (e.g. too 
scarce funding for commercialisation of R&D results, contrasted with substantial budgets for early-stage 
technology development). ICT companies complained about the use of patent-based measures as expected 
project results, as software patents are not admissible in Poland. At the same time, the speed of SF 
absorption in recent years proved that the majority of interventions were designed in adequate ways. For 
2014-2020, the contents of operational programmes replicate the best, proven support measures from the 
previous financial perspective, and introduce new measures, taking into account the experiences of pilot 
programmes initiated by NCBiR. 
Some interviewees expressed apprehension that the strong prioritisation and targeting mostly projects 
compliant with smart specialisations in 2014-2020 might have a negative impact on the R&I system as this 
limiting approach diverges from the rapid pace of technological changes, restricts creativity and discourages 
explorations of radically new research areas. Others were more positive, arguing that the lack of prioritisation 
in the previous perspective resulted in dispersion of funds and smaller project budgets, and the present, 
focused approach could be beneficial. 
Representatives of ministries and funding agencies confirmed the over-supply of applications in 2007-2013. 
Submitted applications included both excellent project proposals as well as sub-standard documents, which 
were receiving negative feedback already at early evaluation stages. Some applicants mastered “the art” of 
writing compelling project documentation meeting the evaluation requirements, while not always delivering 
real added value through project implementation. This challenge will be addressed in 2014-2020 with the 
use of expert panels, supplementing the evaluation of written applications and offering opportunities to more 
thoroughly verify a project's feasibility, business benefits, innovativeness and research excellence. 
More general criticism concerned the overall approach to ESIF as a financial leverage for the R&I system. One 
of the interviewed scientists criticized the strong orientation towards applied R&D driven by business 
enterprises, stating that: “the question is, what the [Polish] state would like to get out of it. Does it want to 
have a commercial product within 5 years, or [ambitious] research, which could deliver something, within 10 
years?” In this view, the use of ESIF in Poland seems to be oriented towards short-term economic benefits, 
which are faster to achieve but not necessarily substantial and long-lasting. Understandably, the 
representatives of scientific organisations are dissatisfied with the design of ESIF for 2014-2020, as 
universities and research institutes will benefit from R&D funding primarily as partners in consortia, led by 
business enterprises, and this raises a question: “does the government want to turn universities into [contract] 
research back-offices of companies, or [would it prefer] to establish new firms [resulting from academic 
research] in a longer time perspective?” An experienced researcher from a large public university criticized the 
tendency to form science-industry consortia for publicly co-funded R&I projects, which has become 
increasingly popular in recent years in Poland: “these [consortia] are often coincidental, ad hoc liaisons of 
scientists with businessmen”. This statement could however be contrasted with an opinion expressed by a 
representative of a technological company, who suggested that Polish scientists displayed opportunistic 
behaviours by lobbying for the introduction of dedicated SF/ESIF measures that would not contribute to the 
increased innovativeness of the economy. A respondent, representing a large enterprise, complained also 
about the preferences for SMEs in SF, and limitations of maximum number of projects that could be 
submitted by one applicant. 
3.2. National co-funding. Lack of national co-funding was not considered a problem in the 2007-2013 
perspective. For SF projects executed by public universities and research institutes, 100% of costs were 
covered by combination of the EU SF and the state budget. This approach changes in the 2014-2020 ESIF 
cycle, as for the majority of support measures, scientific organisations will need to secure co-financing from 
their own financial surplus or bank loans, and this might prove particularly challenging for large research 
infrastructure projects. At the same time, the requirement to provide co-funding is considered an important 
self-selection mechanism in ESIF, and funding agencies intend to reduce the possibility of using in-kind 
contributions by business enterprises, as the need to financially co-fund projects from their own sources 
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ensures that applicants carefully consider the feasibility of their projects. Nevertheless, SMEs experience 
problems with securing commercial credits for R&I projects, as both banks and private investors favour less 
ambitious and less innovative projects, from which the returns on investment are more certain. Some 
beneficiaries complained about the lack of clarity with regards to the use of in-kind contributions in SF co-
funding in 2007-2013, and unwillingness of funding agencies to provide straightforward answers concerning 
these possibilities. 
In the 2007-2013 perspective, problems with co-funding for university projects in SF arose in one of Poland's 
regions. They were induced by the specific design of a regionally available support measure, which diverged 
from the centrally developed template. In consequence, based on the interpretation of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK, Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumenta), the applicant 
universities were required to provide 50% co-funding, which would be free from public aid, i.e. would not 
include financial sources repurposed from the institutional funding, distributed among the universities by the 
government. According to an interview with a representative of a regional funding agency, this shortcoming in 
the design of a regional SF support measure resulted in a substantial distortion of R&I projects, with about 
400 funded projects carried out by business enterprises and only three projects delivered by public higher 
education institutions. This negative example could serve as a warning in the wake of the new financial 
perspective, suggesting that the SF participation rates of scientific organisations could drastically fall due to 
the requirement for co-funding. 
3.3. Eligibility of costs. Problems with eligibility of costs in SF projects were identified only by several 
interviewees. In 2007-2013, support measures had individual lists of eligible costs, with upper limits for 
some cost categories, and these lists were considered sub-optimal, e.g. some research projects could not 
include expenditures on participation in workshops or trainings, while projects focused on competence 
development or infrastructure implementation could not include R&D components. The most problematic 
scenario concerned projects establishing research infrastructures, in which salaries of researchers were 
ineligible, even though the scientists were required to allocate substantial work efforts on implementing, 
configuring and testing the acquired equipment. 
Certain cost categories were unclear to applicants, and required further communication with funding 
agencies. An interesting tendency was also observed at some public universities and research institutes: 
whenever the eligibility of certain expenditures was uncertain, the management preferred to avoid potential 
risks and eliminate the expenditure from the project budget instead of further investigating its admissibility. 
A comparable risk aversion was observed at some funding agencies, which were not willing to accept 
deviations from the initial, detailed cost schedules. Amendments to project budgets were only accepted after 
lengthy processing delays, with decisions made sometimes too late for the project changes to actually be 
implemented, although funding agencies differed with regards to their flexibility. The need to amend budgets 
is not always understood by agency staff, but often needed in R&I projects, as e.g. component technologies 
are constantly being improved and project teams would like to benefit from the newest available 
generations. Similarly, when completed project tasks demonstrate limited feasibility of the originally planned 
approach, project changes would be desirable to generate the positive project results instead of sticking to 
the initially agreed schedules. 
The tendency among funding agencies, which enforced the above-described inflexible approach to project 
plans and budgets, was mirrored by a positive phenomenon: the relative stability of regulations, impacting 
project implementation. Agencies were consistent in applying specific regulations to beneficiaries from a 
given SF call, even though modalities for subsequent calls could be more elaborated. 
The above-described unwillingness to accept amendments to project plans and the risk-averse approach to 
eligibility of expenditures can be linked to the budgetary restrictions of funding agencies, which fear that any 
mistakes would need to be covered from their own, limited budgets. As a director of one of these agencies 
explained, “institutions such as ours mostly learn from people who control them and from what they complain 
about, from reasons why [certain sums of] money cannot be reimbursed. And this is of course a question of 
choice, whether one decides to act otherwise, despite these experiences, and to [risk] refunding money from 
own sources. This could always be done, [covering] ineligible expenses can always be done. And to say: 'why 
should I explain expenses amounting to 500 Polish zloty [~ €122], if I could cover them from my own funds. 
This would be the most desirable approach to beneficiaries in critical situations, when doubts arise. These 
doubts could be resolved in two ways: either by analysing the problem for many months, or by covering the 
[questionable] payment from own sources. [...] Most long-lasting problems concern small contingencies, 
questionable things with small [financial values]. Of course, we are a country, in which [public] institutions are 
still not particularly rich, so they could not bear the [financial] burden of the ineligible costs, [they could not] 
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accept the [questionable] expenditures as eligible, without collecting evidence that the case was exceptional 
or resulting from force majeure". According to the interviewee, the minuteness in analysing project 
expenditures and lengthy considerations of eligibility are related to the financial standing of the Polish 
government and its inability to take the financial risks by accepting potentially ineligible expenditures, which 
would later need to be covered from the state budget. As one of interviewees hypothesized, this aspect might 
differentiate approaches to SF/ESIF by funding agencies in the Central and Eastern European countries, and 
some the more wealthy member states of the European Union. 
3.4. Administrative capacity of funding agencies. Interviewees highlighted significant differences in the 
administrative capacities and approaches of various funding agencies, which distributed SF in the years of 
2007-2013. While appreciating the efficiency of some agencies and positive attitudes of their employees 
(FNP, NCBiR), interviewees also provided examples of problems with other institutions (OPI, PARP, regional 
agencies). In some cases, applicants and beneficiaries could not receive answers to their detailed questions 
from specialists employed by the agencies, who only had limited knowledge of specific regulations or in 
some extreme cases they were actually learning about the subject matter from beneficiaries. According to 
the interviews, some agencies avoided offering in-depth answers or interpretations of problematic matters, 
and did not respond in a timely manner. In one of cases described by an interviewee, a funding agency 
offered answers only after the call's deadline. One of the government representatives shed light on these 
problems by referring to an informal international benchmarking exercise, involving one of Polish SF agencies 
and its counterpart from a Western country. According to the interviewed government representative, the 
foreign agency was supposed to process 30 project applications, while the Polish institution had to cope with 
over 16,000 applications in the same time period, having headcount restrictions and strong anti-corruption 
procedures, which were influencing response times and restricting contacts with applicants. 
In contrast to the above-mentioned challenges, FNP and NCBiR received strongly positive ratings from 
beneficiaries, and were praised for possessing the right competencies and displaying “creativity in solving 
problems”. According to the opinion expressed by a representative of a technology firm, who had experiences 
with multiple funding agencies at both central and regional levels, “NCBiR is the best institution, with which 
I've collaborated. It seems to me that there is a good team of well-trained people. They are simply down-to-
earth. One can call them, communicate by e-mail, talk on the phone, and they do not act as if they were 
behind [Chinese] walls, invisible, unreachable”. Similarly positive comments were presented by scientists who 
had experiences with FNP. 
NCBiR started taking over SF support measures from other implementing agencies in the middle of the 
2007-2013 cycle, and some beneficiaries noticed positive changes with reference to the same ESIF 
instruments thanks to this reassignment. The Centre seems to function as a “well-oiled machine”, but is 
remains uncertain if it could cope with the substantially increased workload in POIR, when it will be in charge 
of the most critical R&I support measures. Before the 2014-2020 perspective, the government analysed the 
availability of human resources in ESIF-implementing agencies concluding that both the headcounts and the 
competencies are adequate, and in 2015, both ministries and agencies claim that the numbers of employed 
specialists match their actual needs. These claims will soon be put to a test. Agencies increasingly rely on 
specialists with short-term contracts including staff employed through outsourcing partners to circumvent 
the hiring freeze in the government, and tend to outsource the processing of financial documents and project 
audits. 
In 2013-2015, FNP organized several editions of a free-of-charge training cycle “Academy of Programme 
Managers” (“Akademia Menedżerów Programowych”) to strengthen skills of employees of various funding 
agencies, including their legal, financial, social and ethical competencies. The trainings were supplemented by 
short international internships at the leading European R&I funding agencies. The Academy's timing was 
synchronized with the preparations for the new financial perspective, and many specialists in charge of the 
present ESIF support measures have completed the study programme. 
3.5. Delays and timing of calls. While the interviewed beneficiaries did not identify delays in announcing 
calls for R&I funding, government representatives mentioned some incidental cases when delays occurred 
due to complicated legal matters. Some SF calls in the 2007-2013 perspective had deadlines foreseen during 
the holiday season or at times, which were inconvenient for applicants, and submission dates were 
announced only several weeks in advance. At certain times of the year, submitting an application might have 
been challenging for many organisations, as the extensive, paper-based documents required signatures of 
representatives of the company or university applying, and the authorised person might not be available. As 
one of interviewees suggested, “funding agencies probably assume that the best project applications will 
come from the most desperate applicants”. For the 2014-2020 perspective, Polish law stipulates that time 
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schedules of ESIF calls should be published on an annual basis, thus giving applicants sufficient, advance 
notices, and electronic submissions will facilitate the process. 
The length of application evaluation process was considered problematic by many interviewees, who reported 
that they had to wait on average for 4-7 months for evaluation reports, while R&D projects in highly 
competitive areas require much faster decision making. Many organisations could even benefit from negative 
funding decisions, as long as they were made quickly and allowed for identifying other sources of financing 
or redesigning the project. There were problems with long time periods between subsequent SF calls (6-12 
months), which did not correspond to the reality of industrial research. Also, some funding agencies were not 
able to comply with initially planned evaluation schedules, probably due to the unexpectedly large numbers 
of applications and higher than estimated workloads. These problems seem to be rectified at present by the 
fast-track application handling and continuously open calls for proposals offered by NCBiR, embedded in the 
new ESIF implementation procedures. 
Payment delays occurred if beneficiaries were falling behind project execution schedules, or if there were 
concerns about some of their previous expenditures. Mistakes in payment requests submitted by 
beneficiaries were not uncommon, including failures to attach all of the required financial documents. The 
only payment-related element, which was considered as problematic by beneficiaries, was the rule that the 
last part of SF project budget could not be paid in advance but only refunded after the successful completion 
of the project and its final audit. While this approach was understood and accepted, the audits were often 
substantially delayed, and some interviewees even maintained that some audits were organised 18 month 
after the project finished, thus putting unnecessary financial pressures to secure bridge financing and 
manage cash-flow problems linked to these project contingencies. 
3.6. Managerial capacity of applicant organisations. Interviewees identified another problem, related to 
the managerial capacities of applicant organisations. Many potential applicants are not aware of the 
existence of suitable support measures, or mistakenly believe that they could not meet the criteria, the 
grants are very difficult to apply for, or that the competition is prohibitively high. The problem with 
insufficient access to information can also partly be attributed to the communication strategies of funding 
agencies and government organisations, but at the same time, they were constantly promoting the available 
support measures in the 2007-2013 perspective. 
The majority of business enterprises are not interested in R&I, or do not understand the essence of R&I and 
think that their efforts in the area of product development do not fall into this category and thus, could not 
be co-funded. As suggested by an interviewee representing one of ministries involved in ESIF programming, 
SF/ESIF applicants need to ensure “a certain level of organizational culture” in order to prepare successful 
applications and adequately manage the projects. A representative of a large consulting firm admitted that 
some of their prospective clients in Poland cannot describe their R&I ideas and expect consultants to draft 
the entire contents of the application, while others mistakenly believe that their proposed technical solution is 
innovative, without performing a basic prior art analysis using search engines or patent databases. These 
problems concern only a small group of organisations, but they highlight the importance of practical 
managerial education as another factor, which could enhance the national participation in R&I calls funded 
by ESIF. 
Many public universities and research institutes have offices, which are supposed to support researchers at 
the stages of applying for projects and implementing them. In some cases, their focus is rather on approving 
documents prepared by researchers instead of proactively supporting them. Researchers need to employ their 
own project administrators, whose salaries could only be covered from the grants, and employment relations 
are terminated as soon as the projects finish, thus creating “a guerrilla approach from one project to 
another”, as described by one of interviewees. A funding agency admitted that scientific organisations in 
Poland used to commit various, minor accounting errors, which revealed the limited legal and financial 
awareness, and were uncovered during SF audits. 
3.7. Administrative burden at the project implementation stage. Interviewees, who benefited from 
both SF and FP funding, confirmed that SF-based projects required substantially more administrative work. 
The most burdensome part of the work referred to reporting obligations, which were precisely defined in co-
funding agreements. Various support measures had different reporting rules in the 2007-2013 perspective, 
with some measures requiring submission of reports even on a monthly basis, and interviewees highlighted 
the particular stringency of regional agencies in this respect. Most agencies were asking for detailed 
descriptions of financial documents and linking them to project deliverables. For some scientists, these 
requirements seemed excessively bureaucratic, but others suggested that R&I projects require a structured, 
methodological approach, involving regular reporting, team meetings, e-mail co-ordination and verification of 
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work performed by other team members. Certain particularly onerous requirements were imposed by some 
public universities not funding agencies, e.g. young researchers managing projects were obliged to collect 
multiple initials from senior university staff for each project-related decision, or internal financial 
departments insisted on certain, inconvenient courses of action threatening that in other cases, they would 
not process accounting documents of the project. 
Further problems arose during project audits, which tended to be invasive and sometimes took a long time, 
until at least some irregularities were identified. When the project audit function was outsourced to 
specialized firms, the stringency increased as argued by the interviewed R&I performers, who were discussing 
examples of audit-related problems, concerning both universities, research institutes and business 
enterprises. Auditors tended to focus on relatively basic financial metrics, which nevertheless required 
substantial effort to compile the necessary data, and the audited beneficiaries were expected to prepare the 
documents for auditors according to a pre-defined structure, spreadsheets or tables, even though the 
auditors were actually remunerated for this type of analytical work themselves. According to one interviewee, 
auditors were primarily interested in verifying whether funds had been spent and all the deliverables 
declared in the initial application delivered, without looking into the specificity of the results achieved, i.e. it 
was important to have the specific number of deliverables but their quality or research excellence was of 
minor importance: “it is easier for the officials to 'tick the boxes' in this way, but science cannot be measured 
like this”. The excessive focus of audits on formal and financial aspects of projects was also confirmed by an 
evaluation report concerning RDI support in 2007-2013 SF (OPI – MillwardBrown, 2014: 130). 
An example of superfluous requirements presented by auditors was for a thorough verification whether a 
large public university was regularly paying social security contributions for each project employee, even 
though the checks of source documents could easily be substituted by a quick analysis of the university’s 
bank account statements. Another example of useless but typical verifications involve controlling whether 
every piece of equipment purchased within a SF project has the correct stickers, including logos of the 
operational programme and symbols of the EU, even though sticking such labels to certain high-precision 
infrastructure might not be possible due to the fears that the laboratory environment becomes contaminated 
or damaged. Another discussed example of audit problems was related to a publication in a scientific journal, 
which for editorial reasons could not include the formally required logotype, only an acknowledgement text. 
Some audits initiated lengthy exchanges of correspondence between beneficiaries and funding agencies to 
appeal negative decisions. Some interviewees described also their experiences with audits of the European 
Court of Auditors, which in their opinions were unexpectedly more pleasant than their interactions with Polish 
auditors. 
3.8. Specific situation of public universities and research institutes. Public universities and research 
institutes in Poland belong to the public sector, and need to comply with specific regulations concerning 
finance, procurement and employment. These regulations are bound to pose additional challenges when 
executing SF/ESIF-funded projects. Public procurement regulation were widely considered by interviewees as 
the source of sub-standard project results, unnecessary, time-consuming efforts and project delays. 
Interestingly, even though Poland amended in 2014 the Act on Public Procurement, relaxing the requirements 
for scientific organisations to facilitate the use of single-source procurement, these amendments did not 
directly influence the SF projects. Even though certain levels of expenditures on research equipment are freed 
from the obligation to organize public tenders, problems  arise when the same items could be used both for 
research and office or manufacturing work, as e.g. in the case of personal computers. University 
administration, experienced in dealing with invasive controls by tax officers, might prefer to organize a public 
tender to avoid any potential problems. Tenders limit the cost efficiency of certain purchases, which could be 
acquired faster and cheaper online or through direct contacts with foreign suppliers, but need to be 
processed by local intermediaries, who charge high margins but are willing to submit bids in the procurement 
procedure in Poland. Flight tickets for project-related trips need to be purchased through a supplier selected 
in a public tender, and materials used in projects might also be subject to tenders in the likely scenario of the 
overall value of materials, acquired annually by a scientific organisation, exceeding the upper legal limits for 
the single-source procurement. Internal procedures concerning project purchases at scientific organisations 
are in some cases more stringent than national regulations. 
Other challenges concern the recruitment of project team members, which might be difficult and time-
consuming even though their salaries are covered by the project budget. Some organisations recruit doctoral 
candidates only once per year, regardless of project-related needs, and others - do not offer doctoral studies 
and need to make arrangements with another institution to officially admit the Ph.D. candidates into a formal 
educational programme. 
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Researchers at universities might also find it difficult to combine their teaching and research responsibilities, 
and the reduction of teaching duties while managing a publicly co-funded R&I project is not always possible 
or turns out to be insignificant compared to the project workloads. As one of scientists explained, “people are 
afraid of the burden and the lack of support. A project manager needs to take care of all aspects of the 
project. [...] Nobody wanted to share with me this responsibility. Everything was done by myself: finance, 
public procurement...” Some interviewees referred also to a demotivating climate at certain scientific 
organisations, where successes of ambitious, younger researchers might be disapproved of ("if someone is 
overreaching himself, his head might be cut off”), so young scientists managing ambitious R&I projects might 
experience additional, organisational challenges. 
 
4 PUSH – PULL FACTORS FOR R&I PERFORMERS TO PARTICIPATE IN 
FP7 / H2020 
 
4.1. Competition with other funding opportunities. Competition with national funding opportunities is an 
important demotivator for FP7/H2020 applicants. R&I grants available in Poland are attractive, relatively 
easy to obtain and applicants are already familiar with the logic of the application and reporting processes. 
R&I support measures based on the state budget combined with SF/ESIF instruments offer so much funding 
that many Polish applicants do not want to look for more difficult sources of financing abroad. As one of 
interviewees explained, “in Poland, one competes against 100,000 organisations, while in the EU, against 5 
million applicants”. One of the most successful SF/ESIF support measures, available both in 2007-2013 and 
2014-2020, targets innovative SMEs and can be perceived as direct competition to the H2020 SME 
Instrument, but the application is in Polish and funding decisions already cover the entire project, not merely 
the preparation of a feasibility study. Collaborative projects in FP7 and H2020 are in turn based on a 
different institutional logic, and require mature collaboration with international partners. ESIF support 
measures allow individual project delivery or formation of local consortia, in particular with scientific 
organisations, and they are focused on developing technologies for commercial purposes rather than on 
pursuing research excellence. In addition, Polish applicants tend to think that H2020 applications are more 
difficult than preparation of comparable documents for ESIF, and these beliefs are actually not correct, as 
ESIF-related regulations involve relatively higher administrative burdens both at the application and project 
implementation stages. Many representatives of scientific organisations combine SF/ESIF and FP7/H2020 
funding, while business enterprises tend to focus on SF/ESIF, with only a small group of firms deciding to 
apply in the EC framework programmes. Interestingly, only a very limited number of business enterprises 
combined both SF and FP7 funding, and most private sector beneficiaries of FP7 were not using SF at all. 
4.2. Personnel lack skills. Lack of qualified professionals, capable of managing publicly co-funded projects, 
might be another factor contributing to the limited popularity of FP7/H2020, but the same problems should 
concern SF/ESIF as well, as both scientists and business enterprises in Poland actively apply for this type of 
funding. There are many training opportunities, concerning managing R&D projects or general project 
management, including courses co-funded from SF. Certain shortcomings are visible in R&I projects of 
scientific organisations, where experienced scientists tend to nominate themselves as project managers, 
without having the relevant managerial or organizational skills. This behaviour might sometimes result from 
the lack of permanently employed project specialists at universities and research institutes: scientists need to 
secure funding for projects and administrative positions can only be funded from project budgets, without 
continuous guarantees of employment. Moreover, many researchers and business enterprises do not 
maintain active international collaborations and the lack of competencies necessary to form and manage 
networks of partnerships limits the involvement in collaborative projects. According to interviews, the most 
critical factor, related to competencies, seems to be the limited command of English among business 
enterprises, as project applications cannot simply be translated by external interpreters, and the linguistic 
fluency is required to ensure engagements with partners while preparing and implementing the project. 
Limited availability of H2020 documentation in Polish language is considered another barrier by some 
potential applicants. At the same time, key R&D support measures offered in the 2014-2020 perspective by 
NCBiR require parts of the project applications to be prepared in English, and it is likely to further stimulate 
the use of international communication by R&D personnel of business enterprises in Poland. 
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4.3. Experiences with FPs and involvement in H2020 programming. Participation in FP schemes is 
path dependent, i.e. previous participation as beneficiary or evaluator of projects helps prepare better 
applications in subsequent calls for proposals. Even though many Polish experts acted as FP evaluators in the 
past, there is no matching mechanism, which would allow potential applicants to benefit from the knowledge 
and experiences of people who have evaluated proposals in previous calls. In addition, Polish applicants do 
not have adequate representation on the European level, which could support their application efforts, 
participate in consulting FP work programmes or offer practical advice concerning projects. Most researchers 
are not aware of the existence of PolSCA (“Polish Science Contact Agency”) in Brussels, which was established 
by the Polish Academy of Sciences in 2005 and delivers free advisory services to the entire scientific 
community. PolSCA’s capacity is limited by its headcount (3 employees), and the Agency organizes 
networking meetings, offers expert support and information sharing. One of successful Polish FP7 
beneficiaries described positive experiences with PolSCA's support in Brussels, but the remaining interviewees 
were not even aware of the Agency's existence. Similarly, Polish government is perceived by some 
interviewees as insufficiently engaged in H2020 programming efforts, as contents of many work 
programmes do not correspond to Polish research specialisations or technology areas particularly important 
to the national economy. Contrary to perceptions of many interviewees, Polish government employs 
diplomatic experts in Brussels, directly involved in R&I policy setting processes, but the problems might also 
demonstrate an EU-wide institutional mismatch, as H2020 programming was disjoint from the parallel 
planning processes for ESIF, which involved identification of national and regional smart specialisations. In 
H2020 programming, important roles were played by DG Research & Innovation, European Research Area 
and Innovation Committee and on the country level, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Smart 
specialisations identification was in turn coordinated by the Polish Ministry of Economy and DG REGIO, and 
insights gained from the local entrepreneurial discovery processes have in no way influenced the work 
programmes of H2020, even though the Framework Programme should also take into account existing 
strengths and opportunities. Some interviewees indicated this lack of “science-oriented lobbying” in Brussels 
as the source of the design of H2020 work programmes, which according to their views disadvantage project 
proponents from Central and Eastern Europe, and promote interests of more experienced applicants from 
Western European countries. Three KIC co-location centres, established in Poland and operating in fields 
consistent with national smart specialisations, support international networking of innovative firms, and the 
KICs' operations benefit from the support of central and regional governments. Polish government and NCP 
were also actively promoting the involvement of local enterprises in European technology platforms, but 
those players who participate in such initiatives do not seem to derive from them direct benefits. 
4.4. H2020 salary regulations. Scientists employed at public universities or public research institutes had 
additional financial motivation for participating in FP7 projects, as they were able to benefit from higher 
hourly rates than their actual remuneration stipulated in employment contracts. This FP7 regulation was 
justified by substantial disproportions in salaries of researchers between Poland and other parts of Europe. 
H2020 salary regulations are different, and only base salaries of researchers can be reimbursed (EC, 2015a: 
41), alongside an annual bonus of up to €8,000, which could only be considered eligible in project budgets if 
the institution meets certain conditions, unlikely to be fulfilled by many scientific organisations in countries 
like Poland (Greenhalgh, 2014). This leads to proportionally lower budgets for Polish participants of 
collaborative projects, when project expenditures mostly concern salaries of researchers. 
Table 2 compares average salaries of researchers (both from public and private sector) representing 
different EU member states in 2006 and 2012. It reveals substantial differences in remuneration, with Polish 
researchers receiving in 2006 on average only 23% of salaries of researchers from EU-15 countries (annual 
salary of €11,659 in Poland compared with the average salary of €50,364 in EU-15) (CARSA, 2007: 19). The 
data for 2012 reveals that the researcher salaries in Poland did not increase notably in comparison with the 
period preceding the launch of 7FP (IDEA Consult, 2013: 41). Salaries of Polish researchers employed by 
public universities and public research institutes are likely to be lower than the values listed in Table 2, which 
also include employees of R&D centres of technological companies. 
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Country Gross annual salary 
of researchers in 
2006, € 
Gross annual salary of recognised researchers 
(R2 level) in 2011-2012, € 
 minimum maximum 
Austria €62,406 NA NA 
Belgium €58,462 €46,756 €72,888 
Denmark €61,355 NA NA 
Finland €44,635 €33,000 €50,000 
France €50,879 €14,484 €20,322 
Germany €56,132 €38,244 €58,812 
Greece €25,685 €23,355 €33,912 
Ireland €60,727 €19,665 €81,456 
Italy €36,201 €34,898 €45,367 
Luxembourg €63,865 NA NA 
Netherlands €59,103 €33,200 €69,360 
Portugal €29,001 €35,172 €43,428 
Spain €34,908 €25,200 €35,314 
Sweden €56,053 NA NA 
United Kingdom €56,048 NA NA 
Average EU-15 €50,364 NA NA 
Bulgaria €3,556 NA NA 
Croatia €16,671 NA NA 
Cyprus €45,039 NA NA 
Czech Republic €19,620 NA NA 
Estonia €11,748 NA NA 
Hungary €15,812 NA NA 
Latvia €10,488 NA NA 
Lithuania €13,851 NA NA 
Malta €28,078 NA NA 
Poland €11,659 €8,415 (35,220 PLN) €14,106 (59,040 PLN) 
Romania €6,286 NA NA 
Slovakia €9,178 NA NA 
Slovenia €27,756 NA NA 
Average EU-13 €16,903 NA NA 
Table 2. Gross annual salaries of researchers from public and private sector in 2006 and 2012. 
Source: CARSA (2007), IDEA Consult (2013) (NA=not available). 
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The differences in salaries of researchers from EU-15 and EU-13 members states impact the budgets of 
projects funded from FP7 and H2020, as comparable R&I efforts of different consortium partners are 
disproportionally remunerated. Table 3 presents data on average project budgets in FP7 and in H2020 (79 
calls). The data are derived from the Seventh FP7 Monitoring Report (EC, 2015b: 111-172) and from a report 
summarizing results of H2020 calls closed between December 2013 and February 2015, based on e-Corda 
database (KPK, 2015: 5). 
 
Country Number of 
FP7 grant 
holders 
Average 
contribution 
per 
participation 
in FP7, € 
Number of 
H2020 
applicants 
with retained 
proposals 
Average 
contribution 
per 
participation 
in H2020, € 
% change in 
average 
contribution 
between FP7 
and H2020 
Austria 3,516 €336,806 492 €386,198 +14.66% 
Belgium 5,458 €337,466 764 €402,982 +19.41% 
Germany 18,088 €394,542 2,249 €672,992 +70.58% 
Denmark 2,754 €385,113 376 €405,451 +5.28% 
Greece 3,706 €269,960 481 €289,611 +7.28% 
Spain 11,164 €291,681 1,614 €324,693 +11.32% 
Finland 2,650 €330,619 332 €360,713 +9.10% 
France 12,590 €408,476 1,533 €455,491 +11.51% 
Ireland 1,957 €319,852 260 €373,432 +16.75% 
Italy 11,845 €303,066 1,431 €328,288 +8.32% 
Luxembourg 246 €245,488 67 €296,524 +20.79% 
Netherlands 8,151 €408,535 1,124 €478,584 +17.15% 
Portugal 2,348 €221,763 398 €271,412 +22.39% 
Sweden 4,506 €379,019 524 €422,896 +11.58% 
United 
Kingdom 
17,561 €395,197 2,214 €408,581 +3.39% 
EU-15  €359,241  €433,232 +20.60% 
Bulgaria 702 €140,499 94 €89,939 -35.99% 
Croatia 397 €225,466 72 €126,598 -43.85% 
Cyprus 460 €201,913 95 €201,284 -0.31% 
Czech 
Republic 
1,415 €203,852 202 €189,182 -7.20% 
Estonia 543 €173,591 99 €142,998 -17.62% 
Hungary 1,602 €181,348 183 €182,968 +0.89% 
Latvia 329 €147,416 61 €145,566 -1.26% 
Lithuania 419 €131,527 51 €118,895 -9.60% 
Malta 191 €109,581 32 €82,309 -24.89% 
Poland 2,210 €198,769 289 €162,426 -18.28% 
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Country Number of 
FP7 grant 
holders 
Average 
contribution 
per 
participation 
in FP7, € 
Number of 
H2020 
applicants 
with retained 
proposals 
Average 
contribution 
per 
participation 
in H2020, € 
% change in 
average 
contribution 
between FP7 
and H2020 
Romania 1,057 €135,705 202 €116,047 -14.49% 
Slovakia 484 €162,025 85 €104,820 -35.31% 
Slovenia 918 €186,133 161 €195,446 +5.00% 
EU-13  €178,130  €154,294 -13.38% 
Table 3. Average contribution per participation in FP7 and H2020 (79 calls, December 2013 –
February 2015). Source: EC (2015b), KPK (2015). 
 
In FP7, EU-15 countries benefited from total EC contributions of €38273.58m (95.24%) compared with only 
€1910.8m awarded to EU-13 grant holders (4.76%), and EC contributions provided to Polish beneficiaries of 
FP7 amounted to €439.28m (1.09%) (EC, 2015b). In the first 79 calls of H2020, EU-15 countries received 
€6,004.17m (95.99%), EU-13: €250.88m (4.01%) and Poland: €46.94m (0.75%). The low values of R&I 
project budgets available to Polish beneficiaries can directly be attributed to the divergence in base salary 
levels across EU countries. The value of Pearson correlation coefficient between gross annual salary of 
researchers in 2006 (Table 2) and average contribution per participation in FP7 (Table 3) indicates a strong 
correlation between the variables (0.747). The relative worsening of position of some EU-13 countries 
including Poland between FP7 and H2020 might further be linked to the salary regulations, which decreased 
the average EC contribution per project by 18.28%. Average EC contributions to Polish beneficiaries in FP7 
amounted to 48.65-89.63% of average contributions allocated to EU-15 countries, but in H2020 the span 
ranges from 24.13% to 59.84% of contributions awarded to EU-15 countries, and these disparities can also 
be found in individual budgets of international collaborative projects. 
Galsworthy and McKee (2013) referred to this problem as to "the unspoken Eastern European 
underinvestment scandal" (Galsworthy, McKee, 2013: 184) when discussing disparities in FP7 funding to EU-
15 and EU-13 participants, and argued that “all researchers must use local salaries, so that the bulk of the 
budget moves to northwest Europe, reflecting the higher salaries there. To believe the differences reflect 
living costs ignores the financial hardship of Eastern European researchers. EU project salary compensation 
offers no respite, rather it reinforces the tilted playing field and fuels the brain drain” (Galsworthy, McKee, 
2013: 184). Greenhalgh (2013) discusses specific problems with the H2020 salary regulations and the 
failure of H2020 bonus schemes to address the challenges of the less wealthy EU-13 member states. 
In Poland, the levels of base salaries at public universities are regulated by a government ordinance (MNiSW 
2013a), so employers cannot easily increase them in ways allowing them to absorb more funding from 
H2020 without a major reshuffle of an organization’s entire compensation system, and irregular 
performance-based bonuses are popular motivation instruments at Polish higher education institutes. This 
situation practically disincentivizes participation of Polish scientists in H2020, in particular employees of 
public universities, who have substantial teaching workloads and might not find sufficient justification for 
administrative burdens in H2020 projects, especially as R&I projects funded from ESIF or the state budget 
could be a source of additional income, added to the existing salaries. 
4.5. Administrative burdens and lack of recognition. Academic researchers tend not to benefit from 
FP7/H2020 participation in terms of prestige at home institutions or academic rewards, as academic 
promotions tend to be based on specific scientific achievements, including publications, citations, patented 
inventions and scientific discoveries rather than funding attracted by a researcher. Researchers might fear 
the project responsibilities, expect only limited organisational support and be afraid of problems with 
combining project management, research and teaching obligations. Institutional assessments of scientific 
organisations take into account their performance in FP7 and H2020, and results of these assessments 
directly translate into the level of institutional funding allocated by the government, but the organisations 
rarely introduce corresponding motivational bonuses for employees, who were instrumental in securing and 
managing the international grants. 
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4.6. Quality of projects. Another challenge impacting the low Polish participation rates in FP7/H2020 is the 
approach to research excellence and innovativeness. Many interviewees representing the science sector 
maintained that Poland's science system does not promote quality but quantity (measurable scientific output, 
e.g. counts of publications or patents), while FP funding focuses on high quality achievements (including 
research impact measured by citations or other forms of scientific recognition). One of the interviewed 
researchers explained that scientific excellence is necessary to become a viable consortium partner, “and not 
everyone is capable of it”. Similar problems concern the commercialisation proposals by business enterprises, 
which often focus on solutions that are innovative only at a country level, as such project proposals were 
sometimes able to secure funding from SF. As explained by a consulting company representative, helping 
corporate clients apply for H2020 funding, “one needs to do breakthrough projects [to apply for H2020], and 
we only go with 'our' innovativeness”, and descriptions of innovative ideas are often less sophisticated than 
proposals submitted by applicants from other countries, who use rich descriptions with facts and figures to 
position their proposed solutions in the market context. 
4.7. Use of research infrastructures. Research infrastructure in Poland can no longer be perceived as a 
limiting factor. SF support measures from 2007-2013 significantly improved the standing of Polish 
organisations and as one of interviewees suggested, after these substantial investments in research 
infrastructures, “nobody has any excuses now” when it comes to preparing grant applications. Nevertheless, 
many potential international partners mistakenly perceive Polish scientific institutions as still having low 
quality, obsolete equipment. The SF-funded infrastructures might also be subject to certain contractual 
limitations and the public aid regulations might prevent part-time leases, use in commercially-oriented R&I 
projects or for delivery of contract research services. The situation is further complicated by the diversity of 
SF-based support measures, which were used to acquire the research infrastructures, with regulations 
ranging from encouraging commercial uses to prohibiting them. This complexity might intimidate some 
universities and research institutes, preferring to avoid any legal problems and thus abstaining from applied 
research projects based on the concerned equipment.  
H2020 IPR regulations. Interviewees with substantial experience in FPs indicated also an additional factor, 
which might limit the programme’s participation. Protection of intellectual property rights presents challenges 
to some highly innovative SMEs, which fear that joining an international consortium would offer their larger, 
Western partners disproportional advantages. These partners would benefit from access rights to the 
“background”, definition of which - formulated in article 2 of “Horizon 2020 Rules for Participation” 
(Regulation (EU) No. 1290/2013) - is very broad and encompasses among others any data, know-how and 
information, also intellectual property rights, held by a participant before starting the H2020 project and 
identified by consortium members as needed to carry out the project. Businesses relying on protection of 
trade secrets rather than patenting might have valid concerns about H2020 participation, e.g. SMEs 
specialized in biotechnology or advanced materials. On the other hand, many Polish firms do not seem to 
understand the benefits, which could be derived from accessing the background of their project partners, 
while this could actually be an important factor motivating them to apply for H2020 funding. 
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5 POLICY INSTRUMENTS FACILITATING THE PARTICIPATION IN (FP7) 
H2020 / (SF) ESIF 
 
5.1. Support for SF/ESIF participation. For SF/ESIF, no public administration offices offer direct assistance 
with drafting project proposals, as such actions would be contradictory to national regulations concerning 
public aid, and the funds should be distributed through open and competitive calls for proposals. 
Nevertheless, applicants were able to receive information through regular information events, online 
guidebooks and contact points for each SF support measure. Beneficiaries emphasized that these 
communication channels were useful for beginners rather than experienced applicants. In addition, the 
government commissioned services of specialist advisory companies, ensuring additional communication 
channels with SMEs. This National Service System (KSU) consisted of entities, which went through a formal 
certification process and participated in the country-wide introduction of new services (including trainings) 
based on centrally pre-defined templates, and these services were publicly co-funded. KSU network members 
were also offering support in identifying suitable sources of financing for projects and could potentially offer 
advice on drafting SF applications, in ways corresponding to the functions of NCPs and EEN contact points in 
the EC Framework Programmes. However, the support of KSU was rarely used due to the limited awareness 
of applicants - not a single SF/FP beneficiary interviewed when preparing this report has mentioned the KSU 
as a relevant support instrument. For the 2014-2020 perspective, the government plans to setup “the 
Registry of [Human Resource] Development Services” (“Rejestr Usług Rozwojowych”), a central database of 
training and consulting services providers, who went through a formal verification process related to quality 
assurance. The database will inform about available training services (both commercial and publicly co-
funded, including from ESIF), but could also be used to identify potential providers of consulting services. 
There is also a network of 77 Contact Points for European Funds (“Punkty Informacyjne Funduszy 
Europejskich”), spread across the entire country, and co-ordinated by MIR. 
As confirmed by many interviewees, the preparation of SF applications in 2007-2013 was relatively easy, as 
long as the applicant had learned the necessary concepts and understood the issues of cost eligibility and 
evaluation criteria. One of interviewees, representing a large consulting company, which has SF/ESIF-related 
services among its revenue sources, maintained that only a small percentage of applicants from the business 
sector use consulting services when preparing applications, and these clients are either large multinational 
companies, which tend to outsource this type of activities in many countries, or inexperienced SMEs, which 
commission the services when preparing their first project application but try to acquire the necessary 
knowledge in this process so no repeat business is guaranteed. Some applicants decided to outsource to 
consulting companies certain time-consuming parts of the documentation, including financial projections in 
feasibility studies and business plans. In some SF support measures, expenditures related to specific project-
related analyses, performed while preparing the project application, could partially be eligible after a positive 
funding decision. Otherwise, no dedicated financial instruments were available for SF applicants. 
5.2. Activities of NCP. Public support for FP7/H2020 applicants is more extensive than for SF/ESIF. The 
National Contact Point (KPK) employs over 30 specialists with diverse educational backgrounds, usually 
corresponding to the R&D areas they oversee. About 25% of them have doctoral degrees, and all are fluent 
in English, trained in legal aspects of the EC funding programmes and project management. The NCP's 
complex services cover all areas of H2020, and its work is organized by thematic areas. In addition, a 
network of 11 regional contact points covers the extensive territory of Poland. NCP's experts focus on 
specialist issues, while regional contact points offer more generic support as the first contact to applicants, 
and channel requests to relevant experts at NCP. At the same time, the NCP also maintains direct contacts 
with applicants from various regions of Poland, carrying out activities that partly overlap with the efforts of 
regional structures, and a lot of time of centrally employed experts is dedicated to answering questions 
asked by applicants, who did not have prior contacts with the relevant regional contact point. 
The network of contact points in Poland is subsidized by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, with 
sizeable budgets amounting to: 9.63m PLN in 2012 (€2.30m), 9.46m PLN in 2013 (€2.26m) and 10.13m PLN 
in 2014 (€2.42m). The NCP benefits directly only from part of this budget (approximately €1.2m per annum) 
(MNiSW, 2013b: 114; MNiSW, 2014d: 112; MNiSW, 2015c: 42). 
The NCP offers mentoring to applicants, support in selecting the most relevant funding instruments, financial 
and legal consultations (including IPR and project budgets) and pre-screening of applications. When working 
with business enterprises, non-disclosure agreements are usually signed if a potential applicant intends to 
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share with NCP details of his project. The NCP also offers an extensive range of information events, trainings 
and mailings, and is active in promoting H2020 participation at events of other public or private 
organisations. 
The information sharing function of the NCP was positively evaluated by the interviewed beneficiaries, 
including its well-received, country-wide tour promoting H2020. Opinions of interviewees about specialist 
advice provided by NCP were more divided. While some interviewees declared that NCP was always able to 
answer their questions in a timely manner, others complained that for certain H2020 calls, NCP employees 
only have the same knowledge as any person who thoroughly reads the publicly available documents, and 
are not able to answer some detailed questions concerning budgeting, accounting and reporting in H2020 
projects. One interviewee complained that the NCP answers to certain problematic questions involved 
referring to specific paragraphs of legal documents instead of using “down-to-earth examples”. This might 
however be linked to the perceived complexity of H2020 and the newness of relevant EC regulations in 2014. 
Also, certain issues cannot be easily explained over the phone, while not all applicants are willing to invest 
their time into e-mail exchanges in order to clarify the interpretations. 
Another identified challenge is the strong orientation of NCP towards scientific organisations and its more 
limited experiences with SMEs. NCP nurtures synergies with Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) contact points in 
Poland, particularly in reaching out to companies and encouraging them to apply for H2020 funding. The 
identified problems concerning SMEs include their specific set of attitudes and misunderstandings 
surrounding the H2020 fundamentals (i.e. research excellence and innovativeness), and for many calls a lack 
of established collaborations with foreign partners. Some potential applicants from the business sector 
expect that NCP or external consultants would ensure the success of their applications, without own efforts 
to strengthen the project quality. Even though the NCP declares that it offers support in matching consortium 
partners, it actually could not engage in such activities for a large number of interested applicants due to the 
existing work overload. It does, however, organise regular events for SMEs, promoting H2020 and in 
particular, the H2020 SME Instrument, and has deepened relations with the business sector compared with 
the FP6/FP7 times. 
In addition to the NCP, dedicated contact points exist also for COSME and LIFE programmes, but they are not 
covered by the present report. Poland also has a separate National Contact Point for Financial Instruments in 
EU Programmes, managed by the Polish Bank Association (Związek Banków Polskich), which was appointed to 
this role by the Council of Ministers. This specialist Contact Point co-ordinates the efforts of financial 
institutions, offering preferential financing for SMEs. These operations are focused on distribution of 
instruments defined in FPs (including CIP, FP7, COSME, EaSI and H2020 instrument “InnovFin SME 
Guarantee”), but the engagement of Polish financial organisations raised their awareness of opportunities 
related to financing innovative projects. 
In May 2015, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education published a draft ordinance on financing 
international scientific cooperation, which is supposed to comprehensively regulate various relevant support 
measures (MNiSW, 2015b) and defines modalities for funding contact points for EU research programmes. 
5.3. Financial support for FP7/H2020 participation. H2020 applicants can benefit from co-funding of 
the preparation of applications, including meetings with potential consortium partners and specialist 
consulting services. The available support measures referred to as “grants for grants” are differentiated, 
depending on the type of beneficiaries (i.e. scientific organisations or SMEs), and funded from the state 
budget. The support for scientific organisations (including universities and research institutes) has been 
offered by MNiSW for many years, with support rules adjusted to H2020 conditions in 2014 (MNiSW, 2014a). 
Funding is available to organisations planning to act as project co-ordinators. Applications can be received at 
any time, without specific call deadlines. Applicants can also apply for reimbursement of previously incurred 
costs of successful H2020 applications. However, some beneficiaries suggested that the contents of 
application forms and reports for these scientific “grants for grants” are relatively complex, thus discouraging 
potential applicants. The maximum reimbursement levels are also perceived as low, with restrictive types of 
eligible costs and detailed reporting requirements (MNiSW, 2015a). The “grants for grants” support measure 
involved budgets of 2.81m PLN in 2012 (€0.67m, 79 projects funded), 1.48m PLN in 2013 (€0.35m, 49 
projects) and only 0.62m PLN in 2014 (€0.15m, 23 projects) (MNiSW, 2013b: 113; MNiSW, 2014d: 111; 
MNiSW, 2015c: 44), with annual expenditures dependent on the number of incoming applications. 
In FP7, scientific organisations were also able to apply to MNiSW to cover parts of the expected national 
contributions in project budgets. The co-funding for FP7 was covering up to 75% of the own contribution 
required from the Polish FP7 beneficiary. Budgets allocated to this form of support were substantial: 72.45m 
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PLN in 2012 (€17.31m), 59.84m EUR in 2013 (€14.29m) and 57.16m PLN in 2014 (€13.65m) (MNiSW, 
2013b: 111; MNiSW, 2014d: 109; MNiSW, 2015c: 41). Ministry of Science and Higher Education co-funded 
also participation of scientific organisations in other, non-EU R&I programmes, but the allocations were 
substantially lower than for FP7: 3.43m PLN in 2012 (€0.82m), 3.36m PLN in 2013 (€0.80m) and 4.09m PLN 
in 2014 (€0.97m) (MNiSW, 2013b: 111; MNiSW, 2014d: 109; MNiSW, 2015c: 41). In addition, Polish KIC co-
location centres benefited from state co-funding of 4.88m PLN in 2013 (€1.17m) and 1.77m PLN in 2014 
(€€0.42m) (MNiSW, 2014d: 39; MNiSW, 2015c: 40). 
Small and medium-sized business enterprises benefit from a dedicated funding scheme “Support for securing 
a grant”. The scheme is offered since 2011 by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP) based on 
a dedicated ordinance of the Minister of Economy concerning financial support offered by PARP (MG, 2014). 
The support is available both to project co-ordinators and consortium partners. Applicants are only able to 
apply for reimbursement of cost previously incurred if the project application met formal FP evaluation 
criteria (up to 75k PLN, €18k for project co-ordinators, 35k PLN, €8k for consortium members). This funding 
for SMEs has not been offered since 2013, but new call for proposals was announced in April 2015 (PARP, 
2015). The budget for this support measure in 2015 amounts to 2m PLN (€478k), and funds can be used for 
applications in “international innovation programmes”, which support R&D co-operation with entities from 
other countries (i.e. cannot be used for applications to the H2020 SME Instrument, CIP or COSME), with 
reimbursements going as far back as 2007, providing that the applicant can produce the required financial 
documents. In previous years, PARP allocated the following budgets to the support instrument: 313k PLN in 
2011 (€76k, 10 projects, 4 beneficiaries), 489k PLN in 2012 (€117k, 15 projects, 10 beneficiaries) and 
1,310k PLN in 2013 (€313k, 40 projects, 12 beneficiaries) (PARP, 2011; PARP, 2012; PARP, 2014). The 
budgets increased, but there was only a small group of SMEs applying for the support, with multiple 
applications from the same beneficiaries: 7 organizations received 4-8 grants each, and their grants 
accounted for 58% of all funded projects. The PARP’s instrument for SMEs differs from “grants for grants” 
offered by MNiSW to scientific organisations, as the MNiSW can only reimburse costs of H2020 applications, 
which surpassed the evaluation threshold set for a given call (MNiSW, 2015a), while PARP refunds costs of 
preparing applications only taking into account the outcomes of their formal evaluations (PARP, 2015), and 
this could potentially promote opportunistic behaviours by applicants, but at the same time significantly 
reduces the risks incurred by SMEs preparing applications, and the numbers of Polish business enterprises 
applying for FP7/H2020 funding might justify this approach. 
In the draft version of Operational Programme Smart Growth (POIR) for 2014-2020, Polish government 
included a dedicated support measure intended to increase the readiness of SMEs for participation in H2020, 
but the measure was deleted from the finally adopted version of the Programme based on the outcomes of 
the ESIF strategic dialogue between the European Commission and the Polish authorities (more information 
about this measure is available in section 7.7 of the report). 
5.4. Support for SMEs in H2020. Support activities, concerning business enterprises, are carried out in 
accordance with the high-level policy document “Enterprise Development Programme” (PRP, “Program 
Rozwoju Przedsiębiorstw”), adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 2014 (RM, 2014). PRP outlines policy 
measures, which are going to be implemented until the year of 2020, intended to strengthen the 
innovativeness and competitiveness of the Polish business sector. Among support measures included in PRP, 
measure no. 1.2.10 concerns “Promotion and preparation of entrepreneurs to use support measures in 
international programmes”. According to PRP, the measure should be implemented by PARP and NCBiR. Two 
specific, listed actions included: offering the previously described “Support for securing a grant” for SMEs 
(reimbursing expenses incurred while preparing applications to international programmes, including H2020) 
and the establishment of a dedicated contact point for SMEs, supporting their participation in international 
programmes, which would complement the operations of NCP. The dedicated contact point has not yet been 
established, and but in 2015, a new call for proposals was announced in “Support for securing a grant” by 
PARP (PARP, 2015). 
H2020-related awareness raising activities are extensive, but mass media in Poland do not seem interested 
in reporting about them, focusing on ESIF instead. In 2014, NCBiR co-funded the establishment of a vertical 
web portal “INN Poland”, focused on R&I news, managed by an experienced media company and the portal 
became an important source of practical, business-oriented information concerning funding opportunities in 
H2020. Relevant information sharing is also initiated by MNiSW and PARP, including through regular mailings, 
for example the Ministry of Science and Higher Education sends weekly newsletters reaching mailboxes of 
over 80% of researchers in Poland. In addition, some large international consulting companies started 
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actively promoting H2020 in Poland, anticipating potential new sources of revenues. The publicly-driven 
promotional campaigns seem to have a limited appeal to business enterprises, who are less interested in 
learning about H2020 than scientists. Nevertheless, after slightly more than one year of promoting H2020 in 
Poland, it can firmly be stated that the awareness of the existence of the programme, its benefits and 
application possibilities is much broader than the past awareness of FP7, and this can be attributed in large 
extent to the government-driven actions. 
Numerous training opportunities related to R&D management exist in Poland, including publicly funded 
programs, and some of them were supported by SF in the 2007-2013 perspective. An interesting example 
was postgraduate studies “Managing research project and commercialisation of research results”, offered in 
2010-2013 in several regions of Poland by a consortium of 7 universities, NCP and the Project Management 
Association, with study programme focused on preparing and managing FP7-funded projects. 
5.5. “Pact for Horizon 2020” and support for scientific organisations. In order to promote H2020, the 
Ministry of Science and Higher Education initiated the process of signing the “Pact for Horizon 2020” (MNiSW, 
2014c) with scientific organisations, formalizing mutual obligations with respect to national participation in 
the programme and promising additional incentives to beneficiaries. Signatories of the Pact declare that they 
would offer effective administrative support for researchers applying for H2020 funding, reward researchers 
who manage grants or act as evaluators, engage in partnerships with business enterprises and accept the 
European Charter for Researchers. MNiSW outlined in the Pact its reciprocal obligations, including: 
 amendment of rules for institutional assessment of scientific organisations to promote beneficiaries of 
H2020, 
 introduction of “grants for grants” support scheme, funding preparations of H2020 applications, 
 introduction of motivational bonuses for researchers carrying out H2020 projects, 
 improvement of operations of H2020 contact points, 
 support for the involvement of Polish experts in EU-level initiatives, 
 carrying out information campaigns. 
 
In the Pact, MNiSW committed also to ensure synergies between H2020 initiatives and ESIF support 
measures dedicated to the science sector, and indeed, this commitment was implemented through the design 
of ESIF operational programmes for 2014-2020, with specific support measures complementing H2020 
Teaming, Twinning and ERA Chairs. 
The Ministry uses the Pact as the basis for powerful promotional messages, highlighting its support for 
H2020 applicants and beneficiaries. The actual policy impact seems however slightly less impressive. “Grants 
for grants” only concern project co-ordinators and have small budgets (up to 30k PLN, ~€7k), thus not having 
substantial financial influence on the overall government budget. The amounts of funds allocated to this 
instrument were also decreasing year by year, going down from 2.81m PLN (€0.67m) in 2012, to 1.48m PLN 
(€0.35m) in 2013 and only 0.62m PLN in 2014 (€0.15m) (MNiSW, 2013b: 113; MNiSW, 2014d: 111; MNiSW, 
2015c: 44), but according to MNiSW, the levels of funding were corresponding to the numbers of 
applications. In the past, MNiSW covered up to 75% of the required national co-funding in FP7 projects with 
the involvement of Polish scientific organisations, amounting to €17.31m in 2012, €14.29m in 2013 and 
€13.65m in 2014 (MNiSW, 2013b: 111; MNiSW, 2014d: 109; MNiSW, 2015c: 41). This expenditure is no 
longer needed due to the different design of H2020, with the exception of projects implemented based on 
the H2020 COFUND scheme. As of June 2015, no motivational bonuses for researchers or organisations 
carrying out H2020-funded projects were introduced, despite the declaration in the Pact, which stated that 
the bonuses would be distributed starting from the first quarter of 2015. This practically means that MNiSW 
currently spends proportionally less with respect to H2020 than it used to spend in the past as co-funding for 
FP7 participation. In May 2015, the Ministry published a draft ordinance intended to comprehensively 
regulate funding for international scientific co-operation (MNiSW, 2015b). The proposed legislation offers 
financial transfers to beneficiaries of EU research programmes including H2020, which amount to 10-20% of 
the project budget, with additional 10% offered to organisations acting as project co-ordinators. According to 
the draft, beneficiary organisation may use this additional funding as bonuses paid to researchers involved in 
the concerned project. This measure – popularly called “Bonus on Horizon” (“Premia na Horyzoncie”) - 
corresponds to the MNiSW commitments from the “Pact for Horizon 2020”, but its design might still change 
based on the inputs received in the course of public consultations, and the timing of its introduction is 
uncertain. Moreover, the planned amendments of the rules for institutional assessment of scientific 
organisations cannot be expected to induce breakthrough results, as these assessments already include 
criteria related to grant funding attracted from external sources, in particular international R&D programmes, 
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and thus future modifications could merely elaborate further modalities for the assessments and increase 
the relative importance in the scoring model. 
In return, universities and research institutes signing the Pact are expected to cover additional costs of 
administrative support for H2020 applicants and motivating researchers to act as applicants or evaluators. 
Contents of the Pact are vague and written in a non-legal language, leaving the one-page document open to 
multiple interpretations. Some scientific organisations initially hesitated in signing the Pact as they feared 
that it could establish direct financial obligations, but in 2015, over 300 institutions are among the Pact's 
signatories. Some interviewees suggested that the Pact shifts the administrative and financial burdens from 
the government to research performing organisations, so presenting the Pact as a support initiative would be 
questionable. The Pact could nevertheless be described as a good practice example, as the formal process of 
signing increases the awareness of H2020 among management of scientific organisations in Poland and 
might have some motivational effects. It does however fall short of inducing major behavioural changes or 
adding substantially new funding streams to entice the participation in FPs. Importantly, the Pact only 
concerns the scientific organisations and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education has no direct 
implications for business enterprises. 
Large public universities have specialized offices, providing support to own research teams applying for 
external funding, both for SF/ESIF and FPs. The effectiveness of these establishments seems differentiated 
at various institutions. In some organisations, centrally provided services include professional support with 
difficult legal and administrative matters, as well as substantial help in securing all necessary documents, 
signatures and internal confirmations. Offices at other scientific organisations might focus on foreseeable, 
procedural matters instead and function rather as gate-keepers than advisors, i.e. restrict their work to 
verifications whether a scientist complies with numerous internal regulations and has secured formal 
consents before an application could be signed by the head of the university. The quality of internal support 
at universities seems correlated with the effectiveness in securing external funding. In contrasts to 
universities, few public research institutes offer their scientists extensive, administrative support for 
applications. 
 
30 
 
6 EVALUATION AND MONITORING MECHANISMS 
 
6.1. Evaluation of SF/ESIF applications. In the 2007-2013 perspective, SF funding agencies were 
responsible for co-ordinating the evaluation of applications for their respective support measures. In the 
beginning of the period, each of them organized an open, nationwide call for experts, allowing interested 
persons to register by submitting documents based on pre-defined templates. Agency employees were 
verifying the documents, confirming the qualifications and areas of competence. There was a duplication of 
efforts by various agencies, on central and regional levels, each organizing separate expert recruitment 
processes, and regional agencies were using evaluators from the entire country. The experts involved in R&I 
evaluations tended to be scientists, with only limited numbers of specialists experienced in R&D 
commercialisation. 
As some agencies admitted in the interviews, unexpectedly large numbers of applications made the 
evaluation processes even more complicated. Expert remuneration was relatively low and uncompetitive, 
impacting their levels of involvement. Experts requested to evaluate specific applications were randomly 
selected from the expert database, based on their areas of specialisation, and requested to confirm lack of 
conflict of interests. NCBiR and FNP adopted a slightly different approach, and agency employees were 
identifying suitable reviewers on a case-by-case basis, depending on specific topics, by using external 
databases of scientists and through individual contacts. As the director of FNP explained, about 90% of 
experts approached in this manner were not interested in participating in the evaluation process, but the 
time-consuming approach still resulted in selecting more specialized and competent experts. Problems with 
insufficient numbers and availability of experts were also reported by other agencies (OPI – MillwardBrown, 
2014: 124). Apart from evaluating written applications, FNP also organized meetings of applicants with 
panels of experts to increase the probability of selecting the most credible and professional projects, not 
merely the most impressive applications. NCBiR tested a similar approach in instruments funded from the 
state budget, and in 2015 introduced them in their new ESIF support measures. 
Evaluators remained anonymous to applicants, but feedbacks and copies of evaluation reports were provided 
to them by the agencies. Evaluation processes were governed by formalized by-laws, adopted for each call, 
and supervised by monitoring committees, which involved stakeholder representation. According to some of 
the interviews, there were infrequent cases of experts infringing the impartiality rules, and those individuals 
were eliminated from further evaluations. Each application was evaluated by more than one expert (usually: 
by three experts working independently). 
Some beneficiaries complained about unsatisfactory depth of reviews by evaluators, who were often thought 
to limit their analyses to glancing over the application, focusing on keywords and on the most explicit parts of 
the contents only. According to unsuccessful applicants, some evaluators might not have fully grasped the 
essence of projects and their context, disregarding things which were not precisely explained and highlighted 
in the applications. An additional problem concerns the ineffectiveness of appeals against decisions to refuse 
funding, when the SF allocations for a certain support measure are used up. Even though the funding agency 
accepted an appeal and admitted a shortcoming in the evaluation report’s contents , nothing more can be 
done due to the budgetary restrictions, and there is a sense of injustice among the affected applicants. 
One interviewee representing a scientific organisation complained about cases when one of evaluators might 
have been a scientific competitor of the applicant, and his or her assessment might have been motivated by 
the desire to undermine the applicant's academic standing. Some beneficiaries complained that funding 
agencies did not critically analyse the contents of evaluation reports, and were accepting them without 
further investigations even if there were substantial discrepancies between the views of evaluators. This 
problem is addressed in the 2014-2020 perspective, as evaluation report are further scrutinized by the 
selection committee and decisions will not be made automatically, based only on the written evaluation 
reports, as expert judgments or other contents of some reports might be questionable. In the SF/ESIF support 
measures co-ordinated by NCBiR, evaluation reports are further used by the selection committee, consisting 
of external experts-evaluators, which analyses the reports’ contents and makes final decisions based on 
additional justifications. 
In the past, particularly problematic cases involved evaluators questioning the project budgets. For some 
support measures, this triggered an automatic rejection of the application, without the possibility of 
amending the problematic elements of the budget. Controversies surrounded the salaries of project 
employees, with large financial divergences between individual Polish regions, not always understood by 
evaluators. 
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There were no pre-defined rules regarding the shares of international evaluators, and SF applications were 
submitted in Polish language, thus limiting the possibility of using foreign experts. FNP, which managed SF 
support measures promoting research excellence in the science sector, was the only agency requiring 
applicants to submit documents in English, and consistently using international experts, with over 50% of 
evaluators coming from abroad (also members of expert panels meeting the applicants). It must however be 
noted that the calls for proposals, organized by FNP, concerned highly selective instruments, with up to 100 
applications per call, while other funding agencies had to cope with substantially higher workloads and thus 
could not replicate the same approach. NCBiR required submission of parts of applications in English in 
selected calls, e.g. for large-scale sectoral R&I programmes, and used some foreign evaluators. There might 
however be concerns about risks of unintended knowledge spillovers when foreign experts evaluate projects 
of business enterprises (OPI – Millward Brown, 2014: 124), Starting from 2015, NCBiR requires substantial 
parts of ESIF applications for R&D funding to be written in two language versions, both in Polish and English. 
As ministries and funding agencies suggested, command of English is still relatively limited among business 
enterprises. Legal regulations stipulate the compulsory use of Polish language when dealing with public 
administration, and requirements to prepare English-language applications for public funding could 
potentially constitute a reason for effectively appealing a negative funding decision. At the same time, 
foreign reviewers are more costly than local experts, and the interviewed agencies mentioned substantial 
delays in the evaluation process, caused by relatively low involvement of some international experts. Experts 
would also need to get acquainted with specific funding modalities in order to assess the suitability of project 
proposals, eligibility of costs and conformance to the overall objectives of a specific support measure, and 
many of these detailed documents are only available in the local language. While considering the use of 
international reviewers as unnecessary, regional agencies emphasized the benefits of using experts from 
other regions of Poland. 
The evaluation of proposals in 2007-2013 included some criteria, which were not relevant to projects, but 
rather to characteristics of applicant organisations, and were meant to promote certain attitudes among 
business enterprises or enforce selected horizontal policies. For example, additional points were awarded for 
having environmental management system compliant with Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) or for 
employing representatives of certain under-represented groups. In competitive calls with substantial numbers 
of applicants, these non-core criteria could have been decisive for shortlisting the successful proposals. ICT 
companies complained about the use of patent-related criteria, which discriminated against software 
developers, who were not able to patent computer-implemented inventions in Poland. Some criteria seemed 
unclear to applicants, e.g. in one of calls, it wasn't explained whether the expected increase in the number of 
employees should concern the R&D department or the entire enterprise. The same criterion could have been 
differently interpreted by two different agencies, and description of certain criteria was considered too 
general by some interviewees. In the 2014-2020 perspective, the approach will be changed with only a small 
number of clear, relevant criteria, focusing on the quality of projects not broader societal goals, broadly 
interpreting intellectual property rights (to avoid biased decisions related to the ICT sector) and detailed 
manuals for evaluators and applicants, describing the evaluation criteria. In addition, evaluations of written 
applications will be supplemented by the subsequent use of applicants' interviews with panels of experts. 
In the 2007-2013 financial perspective, criteria concerning the innovativeness and the commercial potential 
of projects were particularly challenging. For some support measures, including measures offered at the 
regional level, innovativeness was evaluated by taking into account formal, written opinions about 
innovativeness, prepared by a scientific organisation and commissioned by the applicant to include in his 
application. Unsurprisingly, applicants were almost always able to find experts willing to positively evaluate a 
project’s innovativeness. This approach practically undermined the usefulness of the innovativeness criterion, 
which was met by almost all applicants, and agencies had to rely on other criteria in the evaluation process. 
One of interviewees, representing an innovative SME, explained these challenges as follows: “If applications 
can be submitted by somebody, who makes bolts and declares that these bolts are innovative, and by 
somebody else, who makes a drug against cancer, and the drug is also innovative... For me, these are two 
different things, but they are competing in the same call for proposals”. In a similar manner, another 
respondent emphasized the need to draw lessons from the previous SF perspective and avoid direct 
comparisons between “innovative ballpoint pens and innovative robots”. Another problem concerned the 
assessment of commercialization potential of research results, as experts with scientific backgrounds were 
not always in a position to adequately respond to the evaluation questions. 
The approach based on opinions about innovativeness has been abandoned in the wake of the 2014-2020 
period as ineffective and leading to distorted evaluation results. Currently, experts evaluate the project’s 
innovativeness in combination with economic impact and market potential of the proposed solutions. The 
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methods of evaluating innovativeness and commercial potential were extensively discussed with 
stakeholders while designing the 2014-2020 ESIF support measures. The new criteria are expected to better 
correspond to the economic potential and market needs for new technological solutions. Proposals submitted 
to NCBiR are analysed both by scientific experts, who focus on their specialist technical criteria, and by 
commercialisation experts, who are supposed to analyse the market potential and innovativeness of the 
proposed solutions. Moreover, written evaluation reports of these experts will not be the only basis for 
funding decisions, and will further be supplemented by consensus opinions of panels of experts, who meet 
the short-listed applicants, in order to further increase the comparability and multidimensionality of the 
assessments. 
Many improvements of criteria used to evaluate proposals submitted for specific ESIF support measures 
were implemented during the 2007-2013 perspective based on lessons learned, and the benefits of these 
changes were recognized both by beneficiaries and funding agencies (OPI – MillwardBrown, 2014: 122-123). 
The overhaul of the ESIF evaluation processes for 2014-2020 was motivated by the European Commission’s 
and the government’s willingness to ensure that co-funding is only allocated to projects which are 
sustainable, correspond to identified market needs and are expected to have substantial economic impact. 
While this approach yields first positive results on the national level (POIR), the regional processes might be 
more problematic, as regional authorities are highly autonomous in their implementation of regionally 
available support measures and have less experience in RDI support than central agencies. Moreover, ESIF 
allocations dedicated to RDI are relatively small in some regions, making it difficult to evaluate the submitted 
project proposals in accordance with standards adopted for POIR support measures. 
6.2. SF/ESIF monitoring mechanisms. Funding agencies regularly survey their beneficiaries, and while 
preparing the 2014-2020 financial perspective, numerous evaluations and stakeholder consultations were 
organised. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MIR), which co-ordinates the SF/ESIF system in 
Poland, also commissioned a meta-evaluation to analyse among others specific challenges related to 
evaluation processes and criteria across different instruments. There were regular analyses of lessons 
learned from subsequent calls and mid-term evaluations, and during the 2007-2013 perspective, operational 
programmes and individual support measures had been modified several times in order to better address the 
problems identified. In the wake of the new financial perspective, NCBiR tested several pilot instruments, 
organizing smaller-scale test calls for proposals in order to better prepare for the design of new ESIF support 
measures. In many regions, innovation councils operate as representations of stakeholders from different 
sectors, advising the regional authorities in design and implementation of SF/ESIF-based instruments. 
Accordingly, each operational programme has its monitoring committee, which also offers important 
opportunities for feedback from the representatives of sectors benefiting from the funding. 
Understandably, some beneficiaries complain about their specific proposals not having been incorporated into 
the design of instruments or evaluation criteria. The views about public consultations of operational 
programmes are divided, with some interviewees maintaining that the process was ineffective and the final 
contents of the programmes diverge from the broad consensus based on interactions between industry, 
academia, social partners, regional and central government authorities. The actual reason for this divergence 
seems, however, to be the dynamics of strategic dialogue between the European Commission and the Polish 
authorities, as government representatives explained. In particular POIR, the main operational programme 
supporting R&I in Poland, had to be substantially modified following requests from the EC, and no longer 
contains some measures originally planned, with other instruments thoroughly modified (see section 7.7 of 
this report). 
Another criticism, coming from one of beneficiaries, referred to the negative aspects of learning processes at 
SF funding agencies. According to the interviewee, agency employees learn over time, which actions they 
could take without triggering appeals, lawsuits or complaints to upper levels of government. This means that 
they start to understand what they could do without being punished, even though this may lead to treating 
applicants or beneficiaries in a way that might not conform to the official procedures and could constitute 
abuses of power (e.g. shifting burdens to beneficiaries by requiring them to provide documents or take 
additional, time-consuming actions not foreseen by procedures). Since these hindrances are considered minor 
by beneficiaries, they do not file official complaints, but are dissatisfied with the approach. The same 
interviewee emphasized the positive change, which happened when NCBiR took over the implementation of 
some SF support measures, as apparently the Centre works in ways rather untypical for other administrative 
agencies, paying a lot of attention to the needs and concerns of beneficiaries. Some other interviewees 
mentioned that similar, negative behaviour was also observed among project auditors (external firms - 
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outsourcing partners of the funding agencies), who quickly learn how much power they could use in relations 
with the audited beneficiaries, burdening them with additional tasks during audits. 
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7 ENHANCING OR LIMITING THE SYNERGIES? 
 
7.1. Different legal frameworks. The divergences between ESIF and H2020 result primarily from their 
different legal foundations and diverse approaches to projects and beneficiaries. SF/ESIF regulations impose 
limits on expenditures incurred abroad, while collaborative projects in FP7/H2020 stress the international 
dimension. Differences also concern public aid rules, which affect ESIF-based projects, whereas H2020 
funding is not considered as public aid. While ESIF funding distribution relies on the identified national and 
regional smart specialisations, the EU state aid rules with the General Block Exemption Regulation and 
regional aid regulations do not offer preferences for specific sectors or types of technologies. Some 
interviewees suggested that these discrepancies demonstrate inconsequence in the EU’s legal and 
institutional R&I framework, and the lack of adequate delineations between various funding streams. In the 
financial perspective 2014-2020, overlaps exist between instruments offered at the European, national and 
regional levels, and certain H2020 measures such as the H2020 SME Instrument might cannibalize similar 
offerings funded from ESIF. 
7.2. H2020 salary regulations. H2020 salary regulations restrict potential synergies with ESIF in Poland, in 
particular with respect to public universities and research institutes. Their employees receive relatively 
uncompetitive base salaries, resulting from national legislations (MNiSW, 2013a). These salaries can 
nevertheless be supplemented by bonuses resulting from R&I projects funded from ESIF or state budget. The 
EC Framework Programmes cover salary costs and only limited bonuses, and while the problem had been 
addressed in FP7 by allowing some EU member states to deviate from these rules and multiply the rates in 
order to compensate for the salary disparities,, these rules change in H2020, where only the base salary can 
be refunded, and bonuses are only available if the beneficiary organisation and employee meet additional, 
restrictive criteria (EC, 2015a). The H2020 participation problems resulting from comparably low salaries of 
researchers in Poland were described in detail in section 4.4 of this report. Apart from discouraging H2020 
applications by public scientific organisations, the H2020 salary regulation weakens potential ESIF-H2020 
synergies, as beneficiary organisations need to adopt diversified rules for remunerating employees 
depending on the type of funding which the project receives. Polish regulations impose also restrictions on 
the number of hours worked in all externally funded projects, combined with the need to prepare time sheets 
accounting for project work. These regulations were introduced to eliminate unhealthy cumulations of project 
tasks and resulting payments to single individuals, who might not realistically be able to cope with the 
officially declared workload. 
7.3. H2020 IPR regulations. IPR regulations in H2020 discourage some potential applicants from 
combining work funded from SF/ESIF or national sources with international collaborative projects. H2020 
regulations related to granting access to background, which encompasses know-how, information and IPR 
relevant to a project and controlled by a project consortium member, are perceived as sources of potential 
business risks. Smaller, innovative companies might show reluctance in joining international consortia, in 
which all partners would have free access to their “crown jewels”. In particular, companies might want to 
avoid upstream sequential funding scenario, in which SF/ESIF project generates new IPR and technological 
solutions, which can afterwards be freely appropriated by participants of H2020 collaborative project. Many 
Polish R&I support measures based on SF in 2007-2013 were focused on developing innovative products and 
processes, which will be owned by the research performing organisation, and the same approach is followed 
in the 2014-2020 perspective. Such beneficiaries might intentionally avoid direct synergies between SF/ESIF 
and H2020, and rather consider launching a separate, unrelated project based on H2020 funding. 
7.4. Regulations concerning the use of research infrastructures. The use of SF-funded research 
infrastructure is subject to a multiplicity of legal regulations, involving public aid and specific modalities for 
individual SF support measures. Some of them literally prohibit using the infrastructure for purposes, which 
are related to the development of technologies, which might become commercially available, while others 
stimulate or even require the commercial use of the equipment. When looking for research infrastructure 
funding in 2007-2013, many applicants did not consider these diverse modalities, and opted to apply for the 
first call available in a specific quarter of a year, but now some of the investments induce multiple practical 
problems, particularly when trying to implement an upstream sequential funding combination, with SF-
funded infrastructure being a starting point for a H2020 project. In the 2014-2020 perspective, the above-
described challenges related to research infrastructure are addressed, and all infrastructures acquired by 
both private companies and scientific organisations need to be available for commercial research projects 
and thus are uniformly subject to public aid regulations. 
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7.5. Accounting and auditing practices. Accounting and auditing practices constitute another potential 
barrier. Even though the legal framework allows the combination of funding sources in synergistic ways as 
sequential or parallel funding, beneficiaries might voluntarily abstain from implementing such scenarios. 
Some interviewees exercised utmost care when discussing their previous R&I projects as if they were afraid 
that somebody might accuse them of attempts to finance the same research efforts from two parallel 
sources. Even though cost eligibility rules are relatively clear, and project reporting standards facilitate 
unambiguous allocation of costs and deliverables to each individual project, some beneficiaries had negative 
experiences with post-project audits and might even consider potential synergies as a source of problems not 
benefits, thus preferring to clearly differentiate projects and funding sources. One of examples presented in 
interviews concerned the need to carefully consider how to formulate acknowledgements for project funding 
sources when publishing research results in order to avoid double financing allegations. In such cases, legal 
regulations or implementation modalities do not present actual barriers to synergies, but the unwillingness to 
combine funding sources can be attributed to perceptions of beneficiaries or project auditors. 
7.6. Psychological barriers. Another, more psychological than formal barrier might be related to a specific 
mentality, common for managers of R&I projects funded from SF. This was directly confirmed by some of the 
interviewed representatives of ministries and funding agencies, but could also be inferred from the 
explanations offered by SF beneficiaries. SF regulations and their practical implementation in Poland promote 
detailed planning, high levels of accountability (with extensive project and financial documentation), and 
consequent sticking to the initially declared project plans, even if they no longer seem feasible. This mentality 
was shaped by experiences with SF implementing agencies and auditors, but cannot be perceived as a good 
practice for high-risk, innovative ventures, which should be far more flexible. R&I performers accustomed to 
the above-presented approach to projects might not function well in the FP7/H2020 environment, nor be able 
to implement synergies between these different modes of funding. 
7.7. Evolving design of ESIF. Finally, additional barriers to ESIF-H2020 synergies resulted from the ESIF 
strategic dialogue between the European Commission and the Polish authorities, concerning the main Polish 
ESIF programme for R&I, the Operational Programme Smart Growth (POIR). POIR's draft submitted to the EC 
included measures dedicated to directly entice synergies with H2020 with respect to public scientific 
organisations and private companies. The measures related to science sector were intended to complement 
the H2020 Teaming and Twinning instruments. They were accepted in the course of the strategic dialogue 
and are now being implemented in the 2014-2020 perspective. However, the proposal to establish 
mechanisms increasing readiness of Polish business enterprises to participate in H2020 was eliminated from 
the final version of POIR. 
The draft POIR adopted by the Polish government in January 2014 and submitted to the EC included in the 
priority axis no. 3 a measure called “Support for business enterprises and scientific organisations in preparing 
their participation in international programmes”. It aimed at increasing the participation in R&I programmes 
including H2020 and COSME through “increasing awareness of the science and business sectors related to 
the opportunities of using support offered by international programmes” (MIR, 2014: 57). The support 
measure was supposed to include two types of activities: (1) information and promotion activities and 
monitoring of beneficiaries (establishment of a dedicated contact point for SMEs, specialist trainings and 
advice) as well as (2) co-funding for science-industry consortia, clusters and technological platforms, 
facilitating their co-operation with European organisations and preparation of grant applications.  
Formal observations issued by the EC to Poland in July 2014, based on the Commission’s assessment of the 
draft POIR, addressed the support measure in the following way: “The Commission remains opposed to 
financing the support for preparation of enterprises and scientific entities for their participation in 
international programmes (e.g. Horizon 2020, COSME etc.). […] The support of preparation of project 
applications and promotion of such programmes (where combining ESI Funds with the other funds is 
possible) should thus not be allowed under specific objective III.01.1b.4” (quote provided by the EC). As 
agreed in the course of the strategic dialogue by both the EC and the Polish authorities, the support measure 
in question was deleted from the final version of POIR, but PARP started carrying out the concerned activities 
based on the state budget funding in 2015. In other EU members states, actions interpreted as compliant 
with the EC guidelines for enabling synergies between ESIF and H2020 (EC, 2014) were accepted for ESIF 
financing, e.g. in the Spanish region of Aragon, where ESIF are used to explicitly increase the participation of 
domestic organisations in international projects funded from H2020 (Aragón FEDER, 2015: 31-33) or in 
Castile and Leon region, using ESIF to co-fund the preparation and submission of international projects 
involving universities and business enterprises (Castilla y León FEDER, 2014: 48). However, this information 
needs to be interpreted in the broader context of diverse conditions of EU member states, objectives for ESIF 
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intervention formulated in the Partnership Agreements, logic and coherence of each operational programme, 
as well as the EC’s preferred policy intervention areas in individual countries or regions. As explained by the 
EC, “Each operational programme and each individual instrument was assessed on ‘a case by case’ basis, and 
it has to be stressed, that the primary consideration of the Commission was always related [to] the specificity 
of the relevant ESI Fund – in this case the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). […] In the context of 
Poland, the Commission found very limited justification to use the ERDF as a sort of a technical assistance 
proxy for the Horizon 2020 or any other international research programme. […] During the strategic dialogue, 
the Commission was not presented with sufficiently compelling argumentation that would justify the revision 
of the initially formulated opinion. At the same time, the EC endorsed other instruments directly 
complementing the teaming and twinning instruments of the Horizon 2020.” 
7.8. Factors supporting the synergies. The design of ESIF for 2014-2020, in particular of POIR, took into 
account the H2020 focus areas, application rules and programme modalities. There are thematic synergies 
between the Polish list of national smart specialisations and H2020 work programmes. Application contents, 
catalogues of eligible costs and evaluation criteria for main R&I support measures take into account H2020 
practices so that beneficiaries of one programme will find it easier to submit applications to the other 
programme. However, detailed legal regulations need to remain differentiated due to the presence of public 
aid in ESIF, and specific accountability and reporting requirements, resulting from the EC relevant regulations. 
Specific modalities for ESIF funding are adopted by programme monitoring committees, composed of broad 
stakeholder representations, so potential complementarities could not have been single-handedly decided by 
the government but needed to be elaborated and accepted by these different interest groups. Apart from 
similarities of applications and evaluations, there are multiple analogous standards in ESIF and H2020, 
including e.g. shared definitions of SMEs, types of R&I efforts, Technology Readiness Levels, etc. Most of the 
above-described similarities were established in the 2014-2020 perspective, while in the previous 
programming period, divergences between FP7 and Polish SF instruments were more substantial, and policy 
makers did not pay adequate attention to the potential interoperability of funding programmes. 
7.9. Complementary support measures. Poland has implemented numerous support measures directly 
complementing FP7/H2020 and strengthening the synergies. In the 2007-2013 perspective, the Foundation 
for Polish Science (FNP) was offering an SF-based support measure “TEAM”, with research funding for 
breakthrough scientific projects of young researchers, using application, evaluation and implementation 
modalities similar to ERC Starting Grants, and requiring the beneficiaries to pursue international 
collaborations. Many “TEAM” beneficiaries were also benefiting from FP7 funding, so the instrument could be 
considered an example of parallel funding. The support measure helped educate a large group of 
researchers, embedded in international scientific networks, focused on research excellence and capable of 
applying for continuous funding on the EU level. Not surprisingly, both case studies of SF-FP synergies, 
included as annexes to the present report, involve projects managed by the past beneficiaries of “TEAM”. 
FNP also offers a smaller-scale programme “IDEAS FOR POLAND”, funded from the Foundation's own budget 
not SF, subsidizing beneficiaries of ERC Starting Grants, who decide to carry out their projects in Poland. This 
cumulative funding was helpful in achieving critical mass in research projects. 
Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MNiSW) offered in the years of 2010-2014 a support measure 
“Ideas Plus” to offer alternative funding for project proposals positively evaluated in ERC IDEAS competition, 
which did not receive ERC financing. 
In its 2014-2020 ESIF programmes, the Polish government included several support measures directly 
complementing H2020 as simultaneous/cumulative funding to achieve greater impact and efficiency of R&I 
projects. The measure called “International Research Agendas” (MAB, “Międzynarodowe Agendy Badawcze”) 
complements H2020 Teaming and involves Polish research centres, establishing co-operation with a 
renowned international partner to carry out world class R&D projects. ESIF funding can be used to cover the 
costs of these research efforts, co-operation among partners, knowledge transfer and specialist training, thus 
complementing the H2020 funding for the establishment of centres of excellence through the H2020 
Teaming calls. Accordingly, “Virtual Research Institutes” (WIB, “Wirtualne Instytuty Badawcze”) accompany 
H2020 Twinning by enhancing international networking of researchers. In both cases, synergies were 
intentionally designed while programming ESIF. 
In addition, the Polish co-location centre of KIC InnoEnergy works with regional funding agencies to 
complement H2020 SME Instrument by promoting innovative energy companies and co-funding their projects 
as parallel funding. 
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Multiple R&I support measures in SF/ESIF can also facilitate commercialisation or other stages of the 
innovation cycle for technologies, which resulted from FP7/H2020 projects, and while this type of synergies 
was not intentionally planned, one could expect numerous success stories resulting from such a combination 
of sequential funding in the coming years. In a similar manner, measures intended to increase the 
internationalisation of Polish R&I sector could contribute to better performance in H2020, even though these 
sequential funding synergies are not directly embedded in the institutional setup of these measures. 
When asked about ideas concerning further possible synergies, some interviewees proposed supporting from 
ESIF the unsuccessful H2020 applicants, whose proposals were positively evaluated but could not secure 
funding (alternative funding). However, as government representatives explained, automatic short-listing of 
such proposals would not be consistent with ESIF rules, which promote open competition among all eligible 
applicants, and the approach could only be relevant for some H2020 measures with single applicants not 
international consortia. 
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8 TAKE-UP OF PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
The government actively supports the transfer of publicly-performed research and the creation of academic 
spin-offs, with dedicated support measures: “SPIN-TECH” (co-funding the establishment of companies owned 
by universities or research institutes, acting as holding companies for spin-offs), “Innovation brokers” 
(sponsoring the employment of sales professionals, helping universities commercialise their research results), 
“Top 500 Innovators” (training researchers and administrative specialists in technology transfer at leading US 
universities) and “Incubator of innovativeness” (creating innovation incubators at universities). Three latter 
measures were co-funded from SF, 2007-2013. FNP offered a dedicated programme “SKILLS”, including 
technology transfer training (“SKILLS – Szkolenia”), coaching of scientists (“SKILLS – Coaching”) and 
supporting financially the most promising commercial ideas (“SKILLS – IMPULS”). NCBiR offered 
complementary measures “BRIdge Mentor”, with free consulting services available to scientists interested in 
commercialisation of research results (in particular: beneficiaries of previous R&I funding projects, including 
SF-based measures), and “SIMS” (“Science Infrastructure Management Support”), with dedicated consulting 
and legal services to support commercial use of research infrastructure, co-funded from SF. Polish Patent 
Office publishes guidebooks and organises free training sessions to further promote the science-industry co-
operation and encourage commercial implementation of research results. NCBiR's “PATENT PLUS” scheme 
offers funding for international patent protection of inventions, developed by scientists or business 
enterprises. 
For the 2014-2020 perspective, NCBiR launches ESIF-based support measures “BRIdge Alfa” (seed capital for 
academic start-ups) and “BRIdge VC” (VC-type of funding for innovative, research-intensive companies), 
combining EU funding with capital provided by private investment funds, and sectoral programmes, focused 
on co-funding innovative research agendas of selected industry sectors, consistent with national smart 
specialisations and involving public and private research actors. In 2014, the Act on Higher Education was 
amended to facilitate the transfer of IPRs to scientists, who created the inventions and promote the 
commercial use of research infrastructure of universities. 
Poland does not require beneficiaries of R&I funding to diffuse the data and publications based on open 
access standards, but costs of open access publications are eligible in many R&I funding programmes. An 
analysis based on Elsevier Scopus database revealed that in 2008-2011, 42% of scientific publications with 
Polish affiliations benefited from “gold”, “green” or hybrid open access, compared with the EU average of 
45% (Science-Metrix, 2013: 18). 67.8% of local peer-reviewed journals, published in Poland and included in 
the official journal ranking system of MNiSW, offer open access to their entire repositories, or older issues 
with temporary access embargoes (Szprot, 2014: 57). 
R&I support measures available in Poland facilitate the take-up of public research results by co-funding the 
subsequent stages of innovation cycle, and their uses intensified after the 2010-2011 reform of the science 
and higher education, which provided motivation to commercialize academic inventions and empowered R&D 
funding agencies, including NCBiR. NCBiR's comprehensive portfolio of R&I support programmes, mostly 
funded from the state budget, includes: support for young researchers carrying out applied R&D projects 
(“LIDER”), funding for projects by science-industry consortia addressing challenges related to specific 
sectors/technology types/applications (“INNOLOT”, “INNOMED”, “CuBR”, “RID”, “BLUE GAS”, “GRAF-TECH”, 
“STRATEGMED”, “BIOSTRATEG”, “GEKON”) or generic technologies, including KETs, requiring consortia with 
scientific and private institutions (“INNOTECH”, “PBS - Applied Research Programme”). 
The main ESIF-based R&I funding source for 2014-2020, Operational Programme Smart Growth (POIR) 
offers R&I funding primarily to business enterprises, with support measures encouraging co-operation with 
scientific organisations and formation of science-industry consortia, based on experiences from support 
measures previously introduced by NCBiR. 
Industry representatives can meet scientists during multiple cross-sectoral meetings, facilitated by public 
institutions, but interviewees tended to be critical of this type of events, arguing that they turn into series of 
monologues by business and academia, without real exchanges of ideas. Scientists maintained that Polish 
enterprises have no ambitions to be innovative on the global scale, as they focus on serving their local 
customers. One of the interviewed researchers suggested that “the business does not understand the mission 
of science and has inadequate expectations, while on the other hand, the scientific community also 
formulates inadequate expectations. [...] They should be listening to each other, but unfortunately the dialogue 
often consists in reciprocal shouting at one another”. While looking for potential consortium partners, 
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researchers encounter rather limited local interests and in many cases, they prefer to partner with foreign 
companies. 
It seems too early to thoroughly evaluate the efficiency of this policy approach. It resulted from 2010-2011 
legal reform, facilitating co-operation between academic and business organisations, and dedicated funding 
only has been available for a few years, and most projects funded in this manner have not yet finished. 
Tangible outcomes of the policy actions include: formation of technology transfer companies and introduction 
of by-laws related to IPR management by most public universities, hundreds of instances of science-industry 
co-operation (consortium agreements signed due to the joint delivery of publicly co-funded R&D projects), as 
well as numerous partnerships of academics with companies to commercialize the results of their research. 
There have also been substantial changes in attitudes, as before the 2010-2011 reform, scientists and 
business people had almost no reciprocal communication, with separate support measures and limited 
reasons to co-operate, and now they have opportunities to co-operate, multiple discussion fora and even 
financial incentives. A large consulting company KPMG surveyed large and medium-sized companies asking 
them about their co-operation with academics, and over half of respondents (52%) declared that the effects 
of corporate R&I projects subcontracted to universities or public research institutes were very positive (KPMG, 
2013: 18), while almost one third (32%) of the surveyed companies informed about plans to engage in R&I 
co-operation with scientific organisations in the future (KPMG, 2013: 35).  
There are multiple examples of knowledge flows between public universities or public research institutes and 
private sector. One of the most important optoelectronics companies in Poland, Ammono 
(www.ammono.com), was created to commercialize an innovative gallium nitride (GaN) production 
technology, developed by the founder Robert Dwiliński during his doctoral studies at the University of 
Warsaw, and thanks to its partnership with the global market leader in GaN-based diodes and lasers, 
Japanese firm Nichiya, Ammono assembled a large portfolio of international patents and made breakthrough 
successes in international markets (Klincewicz, 2010). Interestingly, Ammono's founder returned to the 
University of Warsaw and currently manages the University's technology transfer office. 
Other examples of commercial successes of the University of Warsaw, which was the most active Polish 
participant of FP7, include: development of metathesis olefin catalysts by prof. Karol Grela (used by chemical 
companies in Poland and other EU countries) (www.karolgrela.eu) and establishment of local production of 
radiopharmaceuticals to reduce the Polish dependency on imports of these live-saving substances needed to 
diagnose and treat cancer (by the University’s spin-off company UWRC jointly with a French partner 
Advanced Accelerator Applications) (http://en.uw.edu.pl/cooperation/research-collaboration). Corresponding, 
positive experiences with commercialisation of research results have also many other academic institutions 
in Poland. The first globally available commercial method for mass manufacturing of graphene was 
developed by researchers from the Institute of Electronic Materials Technology (ITME) in collaboration with 
the University of Warsaw, and the technology was commercialised by a newly established company Nano 
Carbon, which started selling graphene sheets to researchers and electronics companies in 2013, attracting 
investments from the largest Polish metal mining company KGHM and the key player in Poland’s defence 
sector PGZ (www.nano-carbon.pl). Numerous research laboratories were also involved in close collaboration 
with exploration and utilities companies to develop technologies used for shale gas exploration, as the 
solutions used in the US turned out not to be suitable in Poland due to the specific geological formation and 
environmental standards of the EU, and these efforts were co-funded by NCBiR in “BLUE GAS” programme 
(www.ncbir.pl/en/domestic-programmes/blue-gas-polish-shale-gas). Prof. Jan Lubiński from the Pomeranian 
Medical University in Szczecin established a well-known academic spin-off READ-GENE, specializing in genetic 
testing of DNA, with the initial focus on BRCA1 mutations increasing the likelihood of developing cancer, and 
the company is currently listed on the high-tech stock exchange market New Connect (www.read-gene.com). 
Prof. Janusz Bujnicki from the International Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology (IIMCB) used multiple 
funding sources for his large-scale research programme, including FP7 and SF, to make a breakthrough 
discovery of an enzyme, which can cut double stranded RNA molecules and act as molecular “scissors” in 
ways similar to enzymes commonly used to cleave DNA (www.genesilico.pl). The research outcomes are 
currently being commercialized in a partnership with a specialist company A&A Biotechnology, in a project co-
funded from national sources, and the successful story forms the basis of one of case studies attached to 
the present report. Another attached case study concerns prof. Dorota A. Pawlak from the Institute of 
Electronic Materials Technology (ITME), whose work on metamaterials (i.e. materials displaying properties 
that could not be found in nature, including the illusion of invisibility), funded both from FP7 and ESIF, has 
important potential applications in the military area, with follow-up funding coming from the US Department 
of Defence. Among the 2014-2020 ESIF support measures, dedicated funding instruments exist specifically 
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for commercialisation of innovative results of academic research, so even more intensive knowledge transfer 
between public and private sectors can be expected in the coming years. 
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9 COUNTRY TAILORED POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
 
The extensive discussion of bottlenecks in the Polish R&I governance system, accompanied by the analysis of 
specific factors influencing the FP7/H2020 and SF/ESIF participation levels, allows the author to formulate 
policy suggestions, which could strengthen the synergies between H2020 and ESIF, and help better use the 
ESIF-based support measures to strengthen the Polish system of innovations. 
Firstly, recommendations concerning the achievement of better ESIF-H2020 synergies are presented. 
1) Polish public administration should continue its involvement in H2020 programming efforts, and Polish 
regional administration should become more involved in these efforts, participating in the preparation of 
new work programmes in the coming years. With the existing insights about national and regional 
technological strengths, resulting from the smart specialisation effort, the government could be in a 
better position to influence the shape of future H2020 calls for proposals. The Polish representation in 
Brussels should be strengthened to further engage in R&I-related dialogues with the European 
Commission, and facilitate better sharing of information at early stages of programming efforts. 
2) Poland's R&I strengths, scientific potential and quality of research infrastructures should be better 
promoted internationally, so that potential H2020 consortium partners from other EU member states are 
motivated to liaise with Polish research teams. 
3) The operations of PolSCA (Polish Science Contact Agency) in Brussels should be strengthened, by 
increasing its headcount and raising awareness of the intermediary services that it could provide to 
scientists in Poland. PolSCA operates within the structures of the Polish Academy of Sciences, but its 
services can be used by any interested scientific organisation, so a central government source of funding 
seems appropriate. Its efforts should also be better aligned with the operations of the National Contact 
Point. Alternatively, a Brussels-based structure embedded in the network of H2020 contact points could 
be created. 
4) Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MNiSW) should implement all of its commitments from the 
“Pact for Horizon 2020”, including in particular the promised introduction of motivational bonuses for 
organisations, managing H2020-funded projects. 
5) Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP) should implement its commitments from the Enterprise 
Development Programme (PRP), related to: (a) the establishment of a dedicated contact point for SMEs, 
interested in participation in international programmes, including H2020, and (b) the continuous supply 
of funding for SMEs applying to H2020 to cover their applications (i.e. continuity in funding for the 
existing support measure “Support for securing a grant” after 2015). 
6) Polish government should concentrate international efforts to initiate EU-wide discussions about the 
revision of H2020 salary regulations, so that consortium partners representing public universities and 
public research institutes from Central and Eastern European countries would be able to benefit from 
budgets comparable to H2020 funds available to consortium partners from Western European countries, 
especially if personnel costs account for the majority of expenditures in a given H2020 action. 
7) The activities of the National Contact Point should be strengthened, by enhancing its advisory role and 
increasing number of trained specialists to cope with the increasing workload. Regional structures of NCP 
should also be expanded, potentially by using funding coming from budgets of 16 Polish regions, which 
would directly benefit from the increased participation of regional R&I actors. NCP should also consider 
how to benefit from additional funding provided by organisations representing business stakeholders, 
which could be based on performance contracts. 
8) Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MIR) should further elaborate the legal framework and 
modalities to facilitate the use of SF-funded research infrastructures in new R&I projects, including 
H2020 actions. While the possible uses of research infrastructures funded from some SF support 
measures from 2007-2013 are straightforward, there are still legal uncertainties surrounding other 
support measures, in particular from the Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment (POIŚ) 
and MIR does not take adequate steps towards clarifying the situation. 
9) Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MNiSW) should offer better support to potential H2020 
applicants at universities and research institutes by co-funding the establishment of dedicated offices, 
helping with project applications and management. While substantial funds are allocated by MNiSW to 
establish technology transfer operations within the universities, no corresponding funding is available to 
stimulate the professionalization of R&I projects. In many cases researchers need to rely on their own 
skills and resourcefulness to prepare applications and manage the projects, and lack of permanently 
employed project specialists restricts the H2020 participation levels. 
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10) R&I policy instruments should consequently promote positive tendencies, which help bridge the gap 
between Polish and Western European H2020 participants: research excellence, world-class 
innovativeness and use of English language in professional communication. 
 
Subsequently, policy suggestions concerning the improvements of R&I support in Poland are proposed. 
1) The existing R&I support measures, consisting mostly of grants, should be supplemented by R&D tax 
credits. The usefulness of such fiscal instruments was highlighted by many interviewed R&I actors, who 
expect them to offer continuous funding for research efforts at business enterprises, as distinct from 
grants, which provide only temporary support to a small group of successful applicants, and involve high 
transaction costs. 
2) The government should strengthen its communication with potential applicants by promoting diverse R&I 
funding opportunities, helping identify and select the most appropriate instruments. The current 
information campaigns concern isolated operational programmes and support measures, while scientific 
organisations and business enterprises cannot benefit from a centralized Internet portal, guidebook or 
phone contact centre, profiling all of the available support measures. 
3) The government should further nurture the entrepreneurial discovery processes by involving business 
stakeholders in designing and updating the R&I policies, benefiting from the successful experiences of 
NCBiR's sectoral programmes, included as ESIF support measures. The business community should be 
more involved in shaping R&I policies, and policy makers should also ensure a better representation of 
Polish experts in R&I policy setting processes at the EU level. 
4) Co-operation between scientific organisations and business enterprises should further be promoted, with 
opportunities for joint collaboration in publicly co-funded R&I initiatives and dialogues, facilitated by 
public institutions. 
5) Procedures for application, implementation and reporting in ESIF should be streamlined and simplified, 
and bureaucratic attempts to increase the ESIF complexity should be opposed. Funding agencies should 
remain responsive to expectations of beneficiaries, in particular support flexibility in innovative R&I 
projects by allowing changes to plans of publicly co-funded projects if R&I performers demonstrate their 
importance. 
6) R&I funding agencies and ministries should be less risk-averse and have trust in applicants and 
beneficiaries, including more open communication, less complicated reporting procedures and less 
invasive post-project audits. When certain activities involving contacts with beneficiaries are outsourced 
by the agencies to external partners, these partners should be adequately motivated to ensure their 
positive co-operation with beneficiaries.  
7) Headcount restrictions at funding agencies should not prevent the smooth implementation of ESIF or 
other support measures. In particular, the agencies should not be forced to rely on short-term employees 
or specialists working based on contracts other than employment contracts, instead of full-time, 
permanently employed and adequately trained experts. 
8) Funding agencies need to strengthen the evaluation of innovativeness and commercialisation potential 
of ESIF project proposals so that only sustainable projects with real value added are selected. The 
implementation of ESIF should focus on promoting innovative projects with long-term economic impact, 
instead of being concerned with meeting pre-defined, aggregate quantitative targets related to the 
absorption of EU funds. ESIF distribution should include mechanisms ensuring the support of visionary, 
high-risk projects, alongside less risky and easier to implement commercial initiatives. 
9) R&I policies should focus on promoting excellence - not quantitatively substantial outputs, as sometimes 
single publications or patents have more economic impact than sizeable scientific production. This calls 
for revision of institutional assessment rules, applied to scientific organisations. According to an analogy, 
suggested by one of interviewees, “literary awards are not given for the largest number of books written”. 
10) R&I support should be streamlined so that a positive evaluation of a project proposal in one call opens 
up opportunities in other funding streams. Projects positively evaluated but not funded from H2020 
should be shortlisted for funding from ESIF or state budget, thanks to a dedicated, nationally available 
support measure. 
 
Finally, specific recommendations are proposed by the report’s author for the European Commission, 
taking into account insights gained from the interviews with Polish policy makers, funding agencies and R&I 
performers, commenting on their interactions with the EC and experiences related to the ESIF 2014-2020 
strategic dialogue, and comments to the draft report, provided by the European Commission. 
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1) EC should ensure better internal co-ordination so that initiatives related to ESIF do not contradict the 
H2020 directions. H2020 work programmes should take into account the identified smart specialisations 
of member states and regions, so that the efforts at strengthening research excellence and 
innovativeness are not isolated from the identified potential.  
2) Synergies between ESIF and H2020 could only be regarded as a means, not an end - the EC objective 
should be strengthening the R&I outputs in all member states thanks to more innovative research with 
substantial economic impact. In some cases, a competition between diverse funding sources might be 
positive, and there might also be specific situations when synergies do not actually offer added value. 
3) EC should aim at eliminating legal differences between the modalities related to using ESIF and H2020 
for R&I efforts, in particular synchronise the relevant public aid rules in the General Bloc Exemption 
Regulation. It does not seem appropriate that similar R&D projects, benefiting from two diverse funding 
streams, based on the same EU budget, would have different status with respect to the public aid 
element. 
4) EC should further facilitate access to H2020 funding to R&I performers from Central and Eastern Europe 
by adjusting the H2020 salary regulations so that H2020 promotes a genuinely common European 
Research Area rather as opposed to stimulating brain drains due to disparities in salaries, which 
stimulate the relocation of best researchers to Western European countries. The disproportions in EC 
funding allocated to EU-15 member states (95.24% in FP7, 95.99% in H2020 until February 2015, see 
section 4.4 of this report) and EU-13 countries (4.76% in FP7, 4.01% in H2020) cannot simply be 
explained by internal factors, as demonstrated by average EC contributions per project (see section 4.4 
of the report). The problem deserves a broader pan-European discussion, as the restrictive EC regulations 
related to FP7 and H2020 budgeting seem to contribute to a phenomenon, which has already been 
identified by British researchers as “the unspoken Eastern European underinvestment scandal” 
(Galsworthy, McKee 2013: 184). 
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10 REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
Poland is composed of 16 NUTS2 regions, so-called voivodeships (pl. województwo). Regions have relative 
autonomy in defining their publicly co-funded support measures, and both in the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 
perspectives, there are 16 independently developed RPOs (Regional Operating Programmes), based on 
SF/ESIF. Some measures included in the 2007-2013 RPOs were overlapping with the centrally available 
opportunities. In 2013-2014, regional authorities were working on the design of their new RPOs based on 
pre-defined templates, provided by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MIR), so that the new 
measures are more consistent with the nation-wide support framework, and application procedures more 
streamlined. Therefore, an important concern of regional funding agencies was addressed, as previously they 
seemed to only have limited dialogue with the central government, and they were disadvantaged due to the 
lack of knowledge related to complicated legal interpretations of SF modalities. Some regional agencies 
decided in 2014 to formalize their co-operation with NCBiR, in order to access the Centre's expertise in R&I 
application evaluations and the pool of experts. Polish regions have their representation in Brussels, but the 
respective employees were not engaged in H2020 programming and have no expertise in R&I matters. 
The cross-regional heterogeneity in FP participation and SF absorption can be attributed to different factor 
conditions, including the availability of qualified human resources, including R&D personnel, the presence of 
scientific research centres and knowledge-intensive companies, and the performance of R&I projects, leading 
among others to patent applications. Figure 2 presents selected factor conditions, influencing the R&I 
performance of Poland's regions. It reveals substantial regional disparities concerning the presence of public 
universities and public research institutes, with the central region of Masovia (pl. województwo mazowieckie), 
including the country's capital Warsaw, accounting for the majority of such institutions. Regions differ 
significantly in their size, so comparisons need to normalize data by the counts of employees or residents. 
The data series concerning the R&D personnel per 1,000 people employed also confirms the polarisation, 
with Masovia and Lesser Poland (pl. województwo małopolskie) standing out from the rest of the country, 
followed by Lower Silesia (pl. województwo dolnośląskie) with the regional centre of Wrocław, and by 
Pomerania (pl. województwo pomorskie) with the city of Gdańsk. 
 
Figure 2. Factor conditions influencing R&I performance of Poland’s regions (2013). Sources of 
data: Central Statistical Office (GUS, 2015). 
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Figure 3 compares R&D funding, FP7 participation and absorption of SF for R&I in 2007-2013 (including 
relevant support measures from several operational programmes, both on the national and regional levels, as 
represented in the Annual Implementation Report 2013). It is based on data from the Central Statistical 
Office (GUS, 2015) and JRC-IPTS (EC, JRC-IPTS, 2015). 
 
Figure 3. R&I funding in Poland’s regions. Sources of data: Central Statistical Office (GUS, 2015), 
(EC, JRC-IPTS, 2015). 
The data series for the ratios between GERD (Gross Expenditure on Research and Development) and regional 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) explain tendencies in attracting the FP funding, as the strongest regions in 
terms of R&D investments are also the best performing applicants for R&I co-funding. Data on SF-based R&I 
funding differ from the tendency, as in the 2007-2013 perspective, certain support measures were targeting 
regional deficiencies so unsurprisingly, some poorly performing regions attracted much higher R&I funding 
per capita than the more technologically advanced regions. At the same time, effectiveness of these targeted 
interventions is questionable, as GERD levels in 2013 still remain relatively low in regions, which benefited 
from disproportionally high R&I support in the recent financial perspective. 
The interviews, conducted for the S2E project, included beneficiaries and funding agencies from three 
regions, with different intensities of R&I efforts. Regardless of the regional differences, the interviewees 
seemed to share similar views regarding their opinions about the SF and FP frameworks, conditions 
motivating and discouraging applicants, and more problems with support coming from regional agencies 
compared with the centrally distributed R&I funding. Regional differences in using FP7 and SF do not seem to 
result from diverging regional policies or approaches to supporting R&I performers, but rather rest upon the 
path-dependent character of regional efforts, requiring the existence of “critical mass” of scientific 
institutions, innovative companies and researcher personnel. Regions underperforming in FP7 benefited from 
substantial SF-based R&I funding during the 2007-2013 perspective, and with the notable investments in 
research infrastructure and innovative projects, a good basis was established for future H2020 applications 
from these regions. 
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DG REGIO EC Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
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EC European Commission 
EEN Enterprise Europe Network 
EMAS Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
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ESIF European Union Structural and Investment Funds 
EU European Union 
EU-13 13 member states, which joined the European Union between 2004 and 2013 
EU-15 15 member states of the European Union as of 31 December 2003 
FNP Foundation for Polish Science (Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej) 
FP6 6th Framework Programme 
FP7 7th Framework Programme 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GERD Gross Expenditures on Research and Development 
H2020 Horizon 2020 
ICT Information & Communication Technologies 
IIMCB International Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
ITME Institute of Electronic Materials Technology (Instytut Technologii Materiałów 
Elektronicznych) 
KIC Knowledge and Innovation Community 
KIS National Smart Specialisations (Krajowe Inteligentne Specjalizacje) 
KPK National Contact Point for Research Programmes of the European Union (Krajowy 
Punkt Kontaktowy Programów Badawczych UE) 
KSU National Service System for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Krajowy System 
Usług) 
MAB International Research Agenda (Międzynarodowa Agenda Badawcza) 
MG Ministry of Economy (Ministerstwo Gospodarki) 
MIR Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (Ministerstwo Infrastruktury i Rozwoju) 
MNiSW Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa 
Wyższego) 
NCBiR National R&D Centre (Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju) 
NCP National Contact Point 
NUTS2 Level 2 of regional division in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
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